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ABSTRACT 
ADAPTABLE IDEOLOGY AND 
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE TO THE RICH-POOR GAP 
by Gary Stephen Andrasko 
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: Edwin Pak-wah Leung, Ph.D 
Department of Asian Studies 
The last 150 years of Chinese history have been marked by major 
events that can be traced to conflicts arising from wide divisions in class 
structure. Inequities between peasants and landlords in the nineteenth- 
century were a core factor in the Taiping Rebellion. In the twentieth-century 
similar factors were used as a rallying issue in the Communist Revolution. 
Current economic indicators illustrate a growing disparity in income and 
living standards between China's eastern coastal provinces and those in the 
interior of the country. In 1985 urban Chinese earned 1.9 times as much as 
people in the countryside, home to a majority of the population. By 2007, 
urban dwellers earned 3.3 times as much as their m l  counterparts. 
Continued stratification of rich and poor raises the possibility of increased 
social tensions and a possible test of Communist Party rule. Due to the 
connection between income disparity and social conflict, we may anticipate 
that these issues will remain a focus of the Chinese government. 
Will China's efforts to effect a more even distribution of economic 
benefits result in greater democratization? Does its modernization model fit 
into a theoretical construct? What do policies developed to combat the rich- 
poor gap indicate about China's current and future governing style? 
In order to meet the needs of the last thirty years of modernization and 
to maintain its political legitimacy and relevancy, the Chinese Communist 
Party has demonstrated a high degree of adaptability in shaping and re- 
shaping its ideological foundation. The thesis of this paper argues the CCP 
continues to adapt its ideology to maintain alignment with policies designed 
to combat the current rich-poor gap. Though the concept of adaptable 
ideology is not unique to this paper, the academic contribution is found in 
updating prior scholarship with current data related to rich-poor gap policy 
initiatives. 
KEYWORDS: China Economic History, China Political Theory, China Rich-Poor Gap, 
Democratization, Modernization 
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"The more China opens its markets, the more it unleashes the power of 
economic freedom, the more likely it will be to liberate the human potential 
of its people." - U.S. President Bill Clinton, October 10, 2000. 
Attempting to predict the future is a pursuit that is often described as something 
between an "inexact science" and a "fool's errand." As an illustration, anyone holding an 
investment of any kind is probably familiar with the disclaimer that states: "Past 
performance is not an indication of future results." Given the rapid changes of the 
modem world, it might be argued that the same counsel can be applied to predicting the 
future of any country's policies. 
President Clinton's comments commemorating the normalizing of trade relations 
with China may have been one of those "relying on past performance" errors. Mr. 
Clinton could not be blamed for his optimism and he was not alone in his opinion. As a 
partial justification for increased ties with China, the belief that economic liberalization 
would lead to an eventual political liberalization was shared by American presidents 
going back to Richard Nixon. The sentiments also echoed the controversial concept of 
Modernization Theory that had argued since the 1960s that economic development and 
modernization tend to push conditions in the right direction to make democracy 
increasingly likely in non-democratic states.' James Mann, in his 2007 retrospective of 
US.-China policy, called this argument the "Soothing Scenario." Paraphrasing Mann, 
should an American policymaker somehow become concerned with the perceived 
excesses of China's one-party rule, a more "enlightened" expert reassures the individual 
I Seymow Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1 ,  (1959), http://www.jstor.org.ezpxy.shu.edu/stab1e/195173 1, (accessed January 21, 
2010). 
2 James Mann, The China Fantasy, (New York: The Penguin Group, 2007). 2. 
that "eventually, increasing trade and prosperity will bring liberalization and democracy 
to china."' 
It has been ten years since President Clinton's statement and over thirty years 
since the onset of China's economic reforms. The "Four ~odernizations'~ launched by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1979 set China on a trajectory of unprecedented economic growth. 
The impact of the policies on Chinese society has been transformational. Since reform, 
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has averaged over 9 percent and GDP per 
capita has risen fiom $871 (USD) in 1975 to an estimated $6,000 (USD) in 2008.' 
China's admission into the World Trade Organization in 2001 placed it in the mainstream 
of the world economy. A successfUl manned mission by its space program in 2003, and 
hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games serve as benchmarks of national pride and 
outward indicators of a country that has moved beyond the rudimentary basics of 
development. 
It has been well established in the mass media as well as in academic writing that 
the stunning growth generated by China's "market socialism" has not been experienced 
evenly across the country. In fact, Deng's famous quote, "Let some people get rich 
faster," has been prophetic. During the early period of reform in 1985, urban Chinese 
earned 1.9 times more than people in the countryside which is home to nearly 60 percent 
Ibid. 
' The "Four Modernizations" refer to: agriculture, industry, science and national defense. 
National Bureau of Statistics, China Sfatistical Yearbook: 2008, 
http:Nwww.stats.gov.cdtjsj/ndsj/2OO8/indexeh.h and CL4 Factbook, 
hnps: / /www.c ia .gov / l ibrary /publ i ca t ions / l ,  (accessed November 15,2009). 
of the population.6 In comparison, the 2007 ratio indicated urbanites earned 3.3 times as 
much as their rural counte~parts.~ In less than thirty years China's economic planning 
philosophy has shifted from disdaining capitalism to embracing it and its view of the 
correct social order has been transformed fiom a single class, Marxist-Leninist model to 
one that allows for a de facto class structure based on wealth. 
As a study in policymaking, solving the problem of the gap is a particularly 
troublesome issue due to its potential volatility. If government policies move toward a 
rapid redistribution of wealth, especially through increased taxation on the more 
productive sectors, economic growth could suffer causing problems such as recession and 
unemployment. Conversely, given the growing hstration of groups who have yet to 
benefit from the economic boom, non-action could fuel civil unrest that could threaten 
stability as well as the Party's monopoly on political power. The main research question 
of this thesis is, "How will China's political leadership accomplish the balancing act?" 
An initial path to the answer can be found by studying the process of modernization that 
has been followed to date. 
Beginning with Deng's administration in the late 1970s, policymakers established 
something of a "Hobson's ~hoice"' in implementing modernization. Successive policies 
built on previous decisions in a gradualist manner but they maintained an overall 
Alan Wheatley, "Rich Poor Gap Worries Chinese Planners," New York Times, November 22,2008, 
hnp://www.nytimes.~)m/2008/12/22/businesdworldbusinesd22iht-inside23 1.18861664.htm1, (accessed 
October 20,2009). 
' Ibid. 
Thomas Hobson (1 545-1631) ran a thriving carrier and horse rental business in Cambridge, 
England, around the hun of the 17th century. Hobson rented out horses, mainly to Cambridge University 
students, but refused to hire them out other than in the order he chose. The choice his customers were given 
was 'this or none'; quite literally, Hobson's choice. (See: "The Phrase Finder," 
http:llw.phrases.org.uWmeanings/hobsons~hoice.h~l) 
objective of continued economic growth. While deviations and course corrections 
inevitably occurred, the focus on growth was never abandoned? In the progression, 
previous ideology was subject to reinterpretation to meet the prevailing need. Short term 
policy (the deviations and course corrections) was often reactive to specific issues but by 
the 1990s, the long term focus - delivering on consistent economic growth - became the 
selling point of the CCP." The result is that the public face of the CCP looks much like 
any other political organization that has the primary goal of maintaining its power. In 
Western-style democracies this type of political behavior usually translates to running on 
issues that draw votes at the ballot box. In China, the calculus is somewhat different. 
CCP domestic policy actions that reflect its evolving ideology appear to be designed to 
either appeal to new constituencies or to co-opt them in an effort to forestall the ballot 
box." 
The thesis of this paper maintains that an underlying strategy of "adaptable 
ideology" fust developed in the Deng Xiaoping era remains the key element to Chinese 
policymaking. As such, it will continue to play a prominent role in issues such as 
addressing the concerns of the gap and it will be reflected in official policies that are 
adopted. For the purposes of this paper, the definition of the term includes political 
pragmatism, creative responses to bureaucracy, inclusion and cooptation of new groups 
9 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 
2007). 85. 
lo M i i n  Pei, "Contradictory Trends and Confusiig Signals," Journal of Democracy 14, no. I 
(January 2003): 74. 
" Bruce J. Dickson, "Threats to Party Supremacy," Journal ofDemocracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 
28. 
of elites, and the time honored political practice of revising and reinterpreting past 
ideology to meet the needs of the current situation.12 
A review of scholarly literature shows a tendency of research to cluster around 
specific academic disciplines regarding modernization in general and the rich-poor gap 
issue in particular. Specifically, articles gravitate toward either political discussions or 
economic analysis. The perennial political question, reminiscent of Mann and his 
soothing scenario, asks, "Given the broad and successful economic development, why 
hasn't China developed a more democratic political system?" Economic analyses weave 
the requisite quantitative equations with macro-economic theory as they seek an answer 
to, "How did Chiia do it?" This paper pursues a middle path in focusing on political 
policy solutions to an economic problem and integrates relevant discussions iiom both 
disciplines. 
In order to illustrate the paper's thesis of "adaptable ideology," research focuses 
on three recent policy actions covering diverse but related rich-poor gap issues. These 
three include: social policy embodied in proposals to reform the hukou registration 
system; rule-of-law policy change found in the passage of the 2007 private property law; 
and economic policy formulation demonstrated by regional economic development 
strategies. These three policy actions span a t i m e h e  of approximately ten years (1999 
to the present) and have been established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as 
" Lucian W. Pye, "On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s," The China Quarterly 106 (1986): 210; 
Kellee S. Tsai, "Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China." World 
Politics 59, Number 1 (October 2006): 1 18; Bruce J. Dickson. "Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The 
Logic of Party Adaptation." Political Science Quarterly 115, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001): 539. See also, 
Robert Weller's essay "Responsive Authoritarianism," that uses a similar argument and illustrates it with 
Chinese environmental policy and pre-democratized Taiwan as examples. Roben Weller, "Responsive 
Authoritarianism." In Political Change in China, edited by Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond,. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Publishers, 2008). 1 17-133. Andrew Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience," Journal of 
Democracy 14, no. I (January 2003) is yet another example of the basic theme olthe CCP's adaptability. 
remediation measures for the income gap that has grown as a result of earlier economic 
reform and modernization policies. 
Structurally, the paper will break the study into several parts that move &om 
general background information to specific policy analysis. Content of the fust chapter is 
divided into three main areas. The first section recounts the major historical events 
leading to the economic policy reforms that paved the way for policies that created the 
gap. The second section concentrates on ideological shifts attributable to the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The actions of Deng and Jiang are characterized by 
this research as a "methodological roadmap" as both can be seen as having shifted 
ideological paradigms to meet policy needs." The balance of the fmt chapter outlines 
and defines the economic metrics of the gap, h e s  early policy initiatives that were 
responsible for its creation, and concludes with a summary of current richpoor gap 
economic indicators and a description of C h i ' s  national policy response, "Harmonious 
Society." Data used to illustrate the quantitative aspects of the gap issue in this chapter 
is publicly available and accessed from the websites of the National Bureau of Statistics 
of the PRC, the U.N., the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and the World 
Bank. Secondary source analysis is used as confmation that the creation of the gap was 
the direct result of official policy decisions. 
Chapter two is devoted to a discussion of theory and serves two general purposes. 
One purpose is to present a review of literature related to the formulation of policy and 
the other is to qualify how this paper's thesis of adaptable ideology fits into accepted 
l 3  Winberg Chai, ""The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of China's World Views: From Marxism- 
Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era," Asian Affairs: An 
American Review 30, No. 3 (Fall 2003): 163. 
theoretical constructs. In a larger sense, the theory discussion provides a framework to 
evaluate and relate the Chinese modernization experience, of which the rich-poor gap 
plays a significant part, with established theory. In terms of specific content, the chapter 
begins with a review of classic Modernization Theory and then moves to more 
specialized discussions of the so-called "East Asian Model" and Chinese Exceptionalism. 
The chapter's other topic is a review of potential governing models that may result from 
policy shifts. 
Chapters three and four are complementary and consist of the presentation and 
analysis of case studies on the hukou system, private property law, and regional 
development. A topical cross-section of social regulation, law, and economic planning 
has been chosen to allow the study to test for adaptable ideology across a broad spectrum 
of domestic policymakiig. In chapter four, the data from the previous chapter is 
analyzed to identify examples of adaptable ideology as an overall test of the paper's 
thesis. As the purpose of this paper is to probe the methodology and philosophy of policy 
formulation, the analytical emphasis is on discovering why specific policy initiatives 
were either proposed or adopted as opposed to evaluating how well the programs have 
succeeded. Additionally, since most of the programs presented in this research are 
considered long term (twenty to thirty years for regional development) or works-in- 
progress, judging results would be premature in any event. 
The final chapter contains conclusions on the research presented and evaluates the 
validity of the paper's thesis that an underlying strategy of adaptable ideology is the key 
element to Chinese policymaking. 
Chapter One: Historical and Ideological Framework of Modernization 
1.1: History and Background 
Deng Xiaoping's determination in 1979 to pursue a pragmatic approach to 
economic modernization over one bound by ideology could well be categorized as one of 
the boldest decisions of the late twentieth century. In implementing the "Four 
Modernizations" Deng transformed China from a backward, underdeveloped nation to 
one equipped to complete with other global powers. Michael Yahuda described the 
process as "a course that has combined for his country rapid economic development, 
successful economic reform and openness to the capitalistic international economy with 
continued dictatorship by the Communist party."' 
In charting the factors leading to modernization, one encounters a combination of 
astute political maneuvering, bold leadership, and a subtle, though persistent, bending of 
ideology to meet modernization planning needs. It is important to note that timing also 
played a role as it often does in major historical shifts. The fust three elements listed are 
embodied in the person and vision of Deng Xiaoping. The element of timing is the 
historical crossroads formed in 1976 by the end of the Cultural Revolution, the deaths of 
Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, and the ensuing succession struggle to fill the leadership 
void. 
The Chinese economy of the early 1970s was hampered by a combination of self- 
imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution and a misallocation of resources that was a 
legacy of the Soviet style, planned economy. There was virtually no service economy, no 
' ~ i chae l  Yahuda , "Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman, " The China Quarterly 135, Special Issue: Deng 
Xiaoping: An Assessment (September 1993), http://www.jstor.org/stable/654102, (accessed February 20, 
2010). 
8 
competition in consumer markets, slow job creation, and little or no technological 
development to aid industrial output.2 Cultural Revolution interpretation of ideology, 
particularly Mao's directives on self-reliance, worked against education reforms that 
could aid economic development, and that same ideology dismissed foreign direct 
investment and foreign aid in general.3 The debate on how to modernize would continue 
until ideology could be aligned with economic modernization policy. 
In a speech to the United Nations in April 1974, a recently "rehabilitated" Deng 
took an early step in redefining ideology in defming the meaning of "self-reliance." 
Rather than rejecting foreign influence, Deng's comments included the following: 
Self-reliance in no way means "self-seclusion" and 
rejection of foreign aid. We have always considered it 
beneficial and necessary for the development of the 
national economy that countries should carry on economic 
and technical exchanges on the basis of respect for state 
sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and the exchan e 
of needed goods to make up for each other's deficiencies. % 
At the time, the speech and its elements were regarded as official policy of the 
CCP leadership based on the symbolic assembly of most party officials on Deng's 
departure from and return to ~ e i j i n ~ . '  The degree of "ofticial-ness," however, needs to be 
qualified. Deng had yet to consolidate his political power and while his comments on the 
doctrine of self-reliance may have been blessed by Mao, they were counter to the position 
held by the more hard line radicals still entrenched in the CCP leadership. Deng would 
2 Bany Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, (Cambridge, M A :  The M.I.T. 
Press, 2007), 79. 
3 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 
640. 
Brian Hook and Michael Yahuda ,"Quarterly Documentation," The China Quarterly 59 (July - 
September 1974), http://www.jstor.org/stable/652479, (accessed February 15,2010). 
Ibid. 
shortly fall out of favor with Mao in large part due to attacks by radical factions led by 
the notorious "Gang of Four" on Deng's modernization positions. As a result, hrther 
attempts to move the country toward an open, economic modernization were temporarily 
halted when Deng was purged from party leadership for a second time in early 1976. 
Mao's death on September 9, 1976, set off the fmal chain of events that would 
inevitably return Deng Xiaoping to power and lead to the full implementation of the Four 
Modernizations. The succession struggle following Mao's death between his chosen 
successor, Hua Guofeng, and the "Gang of Four" highlighted the fragile state of Chinese 
politics. Though Hua succeeded in displacing the "Gang" by early October, his 
leadership role could best be described as transitional. The Cultural Revolution had 
effectively merged the cult of Mao's personality with the concept of governance in 
~ h i n a . ~  Kenneth Liberthal notes that neither Hua's personality nor his experience 
allowed him to duplicate Mao's style of governing.7 His tenuous hold on leadership left 
an opening for Deng to return one more time. 
Deng, having been purged twice from major leadership positions, wasted little 
time in setting a new agenda. Before being purged in 1976, he had commissioned 
economic and organizational studies as a basis for introducing new policy initiatives. 
Two of the principal report writers were Hu Yaobang, Deng's future, one-time heir 
apparent, and Deng Liquin, the late, discredited Liu Shaoqi's former secretary. The 
Kenneth Liberthal, Governing China From Revolution Through Refirm, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2004), 125. 
' Ibid. 126 
"Four Modernizations," which can fust be traced to Zhou Enlai in 1965, became the 
centerpiece of the policy initiatives! 
1.2: Shifring the ideological Focus 
Deng Xiaoping's ideological statements, also known as Deng Xiaoping Theory 
(Deng's Thought), provide the guiding principles for the implementation of Chinese 
modernization. Unlike Mao Zedong Thought which was memorialized in the famous 
"Little Red Book," Deng's Thought is a distillation of his speeches and policy statements 
that reflect his positions on governing and policy formulation. The six key points 
include: 
1. Avoid ideological entanglement: "Work more speak less.. ." 
2. Speed up Leadership transition: leaders and cadres must be young, knowledgeable, 
revolutionary and with special skills. 
3. Follow the socialist path: practice democratic socialism, continue Marxism, 
Leninism and the Thought of ~ a o ?  
4. Immediate goals: economic expansion, Taiwan re-unification and world peace 
5. Urban economic restructuring should include: enterprise autonomy, wage 
differentiation, bonus incentives, separation of government from economics, 
worker input in decision-making and implementation of a new tax system. 
6. Party reform: institutionalization of central collective leadership, abolition of 
party secretary and institute a retirement system'0 
Viewed in comparison to Mao's philosophy and policies of societal 
egalitarianism, continuous class struggle, and strict central control, one can readily see 
the reversal in course. While taking positions contrary to established Maoism might have 
been considered heresy at an earlier time, the state of the economy and the mood of the 
See Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making ofModern China, (New York: Penguin Books, 
1995). 204-206, for a more complete discussion. 
This point is part of adherence to the "Four C a d i  Principles." These include: keeping the 
socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold the leadership of the Communist Party and 
uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. (See: Evans, 233). 
10 David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng Xiaoping: Political and Economic Re/orm, (London: 
The MacMillan Press, 1988), 28. 
people allowed Deng to justify the deviation from Maoist practices by separating "Mao 
the man" from Mao Zedong Thought." In analyst and popular terms, the policy quickly 
became referred to as "pragmatism." Reflecting on the ideological shift, Lucian Pye 
observed, "Chinese pragmatism benefits from cultural predispositions which make totally 
acceptable behavior that is guided by the logic of the existing circumstances and which 
allows for unsentimental abandonment of past commitments and outdated 
rationalizations. The culture fuels pragmatic motives by emphasizing the here and 
now."12 Perhaps guided by "existing circumstances," Deng took a three-pronged 
approach to change the philosophical basis for governance that included: 1) acting as 
spokesman/champion of the cause of modernization; 2) promoting the avoidance of 
factionalism through collective leadership; and, perhaps most significantly, 3) re- 
examining and re-defining Mao Zedong Thought. 
Examining Deng's speeches and public statements, one can discern a systematic 
deconstruction of the ideology of the old order and its replacement with a modified 
ideology that still bears linkage to its predecessor. In 1976, Deng articulated his vision 
for modernization in talks to various work groups and in speeches at party meetings. His 
role as a spokesman andlor champion of the process is reflected in the following passage. 
There is at present a need to put things in order in every 
field. Agriculture and industry must be put in order, and the 
policies on literature and art need to be adjusted. 
Adjustment, in fact, also means putting things in order. By 
putting things in order, we want to solve problems in rural 
areas, in factories, in science and technology, and in all 
other spheres ... At present, there are a good many 
" Evans, 235. 
I2 Lucien W. Pye, "On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s.'' The China Quarterly 106, (June 1986), 
hnp://www.jstor.org/stable/653429, (accessed February 20,2010). 
problems which we cannot solve without great effort. We 
must be daring and resolute." 
While the full text pays the necessary homage to socialist principles and Mao Zedong 
Thought, the major thrust of concentrating on the task at hand is central. The concept of 
putting the task first will become a familiar theme in most of Deng's policy statements.14 
His use of the fust person, plural pronoun, "we," is also significant as it illustrates a 
collective decision-making/problem solving approach. 
The shift h m  a rigid, dogmatic approach to one of pragmatism is evident in the 
following excerpt from an interview with Western scholars. The third sentence is 
particularly interesting in its d e f ~ t i v e  linkage of better living standards with the idea of 
the revolution being a success. 
Modernization does represent a great new revolution. The 
aim of our revolution is to liberate and expand the 
productive forces. Without expanding the productive 
forces, makiig our country prosperous and powerful, and 
improving the living standards of the people, our revolution 
is juit empty talk.. . Of course, we do not want capitalism, 
but neither do we want to be poor under socialism. What 
we want is socialism in which the productive forces are 
developed and the country is prosperous and powerful.'5 
Note how this passage also l i i  to basic CCP values as it equates the campaign for 
modernization with revolution. Though Deng was proposing changes for China that had 
l 3  Deng Xiaoping, "Things Must Be Put in Order in All Fields," Remarks at a forum on work in the 
rural areas, September 27 and October 4, 1975, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn~den~~voWtex~1090.html, (accessed February 18,2010). 
14 Evans, 235. 
" Deng Xiaoping, "We Can Develop a Market Economy Under Socialism," Excerpt from a talk with 
Frank B. Gihney, Vice-chairman of the Compilation Committee of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. of the 
United States, Paul T. K. Lin, Director of the Institute of East Asia at McGill University of Canada, and 
others, November 26, 1979, h t t p : / / e n g l i s h . p e o p l e d a i l y . w m . c d d e n ~ ,  (accessed 
Febmary 13,2010) 
not been attempted elsewhere in the socialist world, he maintained linkage to familiar and 
accepted ideology in proposing the changes.16 
Deng's second emphasis, eliminating factionalism and restoring collective 
leadership, ran along a parallel path to implementing the Four Modernizations. One can 
infer how this focus was influenced by Deng's personal experiences of being purged 
twice due to political infighting. However, in examples such as the following it can also 
be seen how he uses anti-factional statements to align his programs with his defmition of 
orthodox tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
... In order to achieve the four modernizations we must 
keep to the socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, uphold the leadership of the Communist Party, 
and uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
The Central Committee considers that we must now 
repeatedly emphasize the necessity of upholding these four 
cardinal principles, because certain people (even if only a 
handful) are attempting to undermine them. In no way can 
such attempts be tolerated.. . To undermine any of the four 
cardinal principles is to undermine the whole cause of 
socialism in China, the whole cause of modernization ... 17 
Similar to the previous passage where he ties modernization to established ideology, 
Deng, summarizes the need for unity under Party leadership by citing the Four Cardinal 
Principles in the following 1981 address. 
Since we began stressing the need to uphold the Four 
Cardinal Principles, comrades in our ideological circles 
have become clearer in their thinking. Because of this and 
also because of the resolute steps taken to get rid of illegal 
organizations and publications, the situation has improved. 
But we must remain on the alert. Some people are raising a 
banner in support of Comrade Hua Guofeng, while actually 
l 6  Naughton, 86. 
" Deng Xiaoping, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," A speech at a forum on the principles for 
the Party's theoretical work, March 30, 1979, hnp://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/tex~1290.html, 
(accessed February 18,201 0) 
trying to overthrow you know who. Watch out! This shows 
how complicated the present struggle is, and how necessary 
it is to sharpen our vigilance.. . To sum up, our entire Party, 
army and people should unite as one, march in step, and 
work hard to achieve further success under the leadership 
of the Central Committee.. . 18 
The fmal emphasis, re-defming Mao Zedong Thought, was a complex, yet 
necessary, component. Chang observes that "implementation of the modernizations 
required a drastic change of attitude toward a realistic evaluation of the past mistakes 
both in policy and in ideology."'9 To accomplish a "realistic evaluation," and quite 
possibly to demonstrate his belief in collective leadership, Deng astutely pushed for a 
formal review of Mao's accomplishments and Thought as part of a larger study of post- 
Revolution history performed under the auspices of the Central Committee. 
While work groups under the supervision of the Central Committee performed the 
actual task of reviewing history, Deng embarked on a series of speeches and meetings 
where he systematically dissected the interpretations of Mao teachings and doctrines. In 
- 
these settings Deng's tone was one of respect for Mao's work and, without fail, the 
message maintained Mao's equal place in the Communist pantheon with Max, Engels, 
and Lenin. Deng's task amounted to disproving a commonly held paradigm. From the 
Cultural Revolution until his death, Mao had reached such a degree of semi-deification 
that his followers attempted to enshrine a doctrine of "whatever Mao did or said must 
guide future actions." Known as the "Two Whatevers," the doctrine would have all but 
'' Deng Xiaoping, "Concerning Problems in the Ideological Front," Summary of a talk with leading 
comrades of the central propaganda departmenu, July 17, 198 I ,  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn~dengxpIv0I2/te~t/bl530.hbnl, (accessed Febru;uy 18, 2010). 
l 9  Chang, 34. 
prevented the Four Modernizations as the policy departed from Mao's semi-doctrine of 
self-reliance. 
In responding to what he categorized as a misinterpretation of Mao Thought, 
Deng employed arguments of hermeneutic consistency citing Marx, Lenin and Mao, 
himself, to make the claim for his version of ideological interpretation. 
The "two whatevers" are unacceptable. If this principle 
were correct, there could be no justification for my 
rehabilitation ... We cannot mechanically apply what 
Comrade Mao Zedong said about a particular question to 
another question, what he said in a particular place to 
another place, what he said at a particular time to another 
time, or what he said under particular circumstances to 
other circumstances ... Neither Marx nor Engels put 
forward any "whatever" doctrine, nor did Lenin or Stalin, 
nor did Comrade Mao Zedong himseltZ0 
In the previous argument Deng cited the full range of Communist ideological orthodoxy 
to discredit the "Two Whatevers." The next year, while addressing a CCP function in 
Jilin, he took aim at the doctrine using the specific force of Mao'Zedong Thought. 
As you all know, there is a doctrine known as the "two 
whatevers". Hasn't it become famous? According to this 
doctrine, whatever documents Comrade Mao Zedong read 
and endorsed and whatever he did and said must always 
determine our actions, without the slightest deviation. Can 
this be called holding high the banner of Mao Zedong 
Thought? Certainly not! If this goes on, it will debase Mao 
Zedong Thought. The fundamental point of Mao Zedong 
Thought is seeking truth from facts and integrating the 
universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete 
practice of the Chinese revolution. Comrade Mao Zedong 
wrote a four-word motto for the Central Party School in 
20 Deng Xiaoping, "The 'Two Whatevers' Do Not Accord With Marxism," Excerpt from a talk with 
two leading comrades of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, May 24,1977, 
h t t p : / / e n g l i s h . p e o p l e d a i l y . c o m . c n / d e n ~ l  lOO.html, (accessed February 18,2010). 
16 
Yan'an: "Seek truth from facts." These four words are the 
quintessence of Mao Zedong Tho~ght .~ '  
Even in its translated form, one can appreciate both the emotional and intellectual force 
of the argument presented. It is also hard to miss the biting sarcasm of his opening as he 
frames his opposition to the idea. 
In 1981, the Central Committee approved a resolution entitled, "Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's 
Republic of China." The report reversed the verdict on the Cultural Revolution by stating, 
The history of the "cultural revolution" has proved that 
Comrade Mao Zedong's principal theses for initiating this 
revolution conformed neither to Marxism, Leninism nor to 
Chinese reality. They represent an entirely erroneous 
appraisal of the prevailing class relations and political 
situation in the Party and state." 
The document went on to bless Deng Xiaoping's policies and overall vision by 
observing, 
The plenary session resolutely criticized the erroneous 
"two-whatever's" policy and fully affirmed the need to 
grasp Mao Zedong Thought comprehensively and 
accurately as a scientific system. It ... decided on the 
guiding principle of emancipating the mind, using our 
brains, seeking truth &om facts and uniting as one in 
looking forward to the future. It firmly discarded the slogan 
"Take class struggle as the key link," which had become 
unsuitable in a socialist society, and made the strategic 
decision to shift the focus of work to socialist 
m~demization.~' 
21 Deng Xiaoping, "Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of 
Seeking Truth From Facts," Excerpt from remarks made on hearing a work report by members of the 
Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, September 16, 
1978, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/1220.html, (accessed February 18,2010). 
2Z "Resolution on certain questions in the history of ow party since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China," Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on June 27, I98 1, 
h t t p J / w . m a n r i s t s . o r g / s u b j e c t ~ c h i n a / d O l  .htm, (accessed February 18,2010). 
23 Ibid. 
In adopting the resolution, the Central Committee effectively muted political and 
ideological debate regarding Deng's plans, essentially established economic pragmatism 
and the Four Modernizations as official policy, and memorialized Deng's vision as a 
roadmap for his eventual su~cessors .~~  The Central Committee action would eventually 
enable Deng to introduce the concept of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," and 
endorse the principle of "Primary Stage Socialism" to justify open market reforms. 
In 1997, Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, built on Deng's ideological shift by 
introducing his own variant, the "Three Represents." According to Jiang, the "Three 
Represents" recognized: "the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, 
the orientation of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."25 In practice, the doctrine opened party 
membership to entrepreneurs and members of the business class -groups that had been 
pariahs in early times. Most analysts regard the move as one to co-opt the new class of 
elites (technocrats, business executives, etc) in China to keep the CCP relevant and 
insulated against political competition.26 In terms of orthodox Marxist ideology, Jiang's 
declaration ignored the concept of class struggle (Deng's previous reinterpretations 
blessed by the Central Committee had made it a non-factor) and redefmed the 
qualifications for CCP membership. 
24 chang, 28. Note: Chang's discussion is limited to Deng, but one later sees the administrations of 
both Jiang Zemin and Hu ~ i n t b  cite not only ~arxist-~eninist i d  Mao Zedong Thought, but also the 
"Principles of Deng Xiaoping Thought" as legitimizing philosophy when introducing new policy directives. 
25 Jiang Zemin, "Three Represents," http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.h, (accessed 
February 20,2010). 
"Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," Chino Leadership Monitor 8 (Fall 2003), 
http:Nmedia.hoover.org~documentslclm8jEp (accessed February 20,201 0). 
The impact of the shift in ideological focus from Mao to Deng to Jiang cannot be 
understated. In retrospect, it is difficult to envision that economic modernization would 
have progressed as thoroughly or as quickly without the ideological changes. Cheng and 
White describe the change as transforming the Party and the PRC Government "from a 
'mobilizing party' and a 'tool of proletarian dictatorship' into organizations concerned 
primarily with executive and administrative functions in so~iety."~' In an article 
reviewing Deng Xiaoping's legacy written shortly after his death, Pye ~ointedly 
characterized the outcome of Deng's ideological reset as "the basic essence of the 
traditional Chinese style of government in which the topmost leaders could solemnly 
proclaim an ideology which required only lip service; lesser officials could freely practice 
feigned compliance.. . and do what they thought best for themselves and their 
1.3: Modernization Policy 
Most observers track China's modernization in two phases: 1978 to 1993 and 
1993 onward.29 A "dual track" economy was established in the fmt phase that featured a 
combination of the existent top-down, centralized economy while introducing market 
reforms in selected sectors. Due to its fundamental importance in feeding the nation, the 
fust of the sectors designated for reform was agriculture. Employing a trial-and-error 
approach that Deng metaphorically described as "stepping gingerly from stone to stone in 
'' Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: 
From Mobilizers to Managers," Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (April 1988), http://www.jstor.org/stableI2644734, 
(Accessed February 20.2010). 
Lucian W. Pye , "An Introductoly Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture," The 
China Quarterly 135, Special Issue: Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment (September 1993), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/654096, (Accessed February 20,201 0). 
29 Naughton, 90. 
a stream," the market reforins were expanded to additional sectors after successful 
integration of the pilot sectors.30 The objective of the strategy was to prevent disruptive 
economic shocks as well as to gradually transition the economy to a market driven 
system. In practice, keeping both tracks had the impact of providing opportunities for 
those who participated in the market track to profit while maintaining the planned track 
provided subsidies to compensate potential losers.31 Due to the firewalls in the planned 
portion, this hybrid model, and the fmt phase in general, is often described as "reform 
without losers."32 
In order to effect the transition to a market economy, planners kept the allocation 
of resources to the old central plan at a fixed level while the market sector essentially 
outgrew the planned portion.33 As an incentive to privatization, the replacement of the 
part of the economy that moved from the planned sector to the market economy received 
favorable treatment by a tax and credit mechanism.34 As a result, by 1989, the number of 
products covered by state planning was reduced from 120 to 60 and the number of 
materials under state unified planning diminished from 256 to 26.35 By 1993, the market 
was the dominant sector and subsidies from the planned sector were reduced or 
eliminated. This signaled China's move into its second phase of modernization. This 
Michael Y. M. Kau and Susan H. Marsh, China in the Era of DengXiaoping: A Decade of Refom, 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 3. 
" Yingyi Qian, "How Reform in C h i  Worked," William Davidson Working Paper Number 473~3, 
(Ann Arbor: William Davidson Institute - University of Michigan School of Business, 2002), 18. 
j2 Naughton, 91 
jJ Ibid, 64 
34 I-Chuan Wu-Beyens, "The Years of Reform in China: Economic Growth Venus Modernization," 
Civilisations - Revue Internationale D 'Anthropologie et de Sciences Humaines 40, no. 1 (1 991), 
http:Ncivilisations.revues.org/index1680.html, (accessed December 1,2009). 
'' ''The Chinese Economy in 1988", Beijing Review, February 6-12,1989, cited in Wu-Beyens. 
phase, except for so-called critical industries such as defense, telecommunications, and 
energy, was de-centralized, market driven and characterized as "reform with losers."36 
Though some of the reform policies, particularly those in the agricultural sector, 
began to exhibit diminishing returns as early as the latc-1980's, the overall growth in the 
economy was nothing short of phenomenal. In the years between 1979 and 2007, China 
could proudly publish positive results that included: a decrease in the poverty rate from 
53 percent to 7 percent, 9.6 percent annual GDP growth since 1979, and an increase in 
life expectancy from 62 in 1970 to 73 in 2007.3' On the negative side of the ledger, 
income disparity began to grow. In reality it was a direct by-product of the reform 
policies. Individuals who moved into market sectors fust were the biggest winners. 
Continued subsidies to state owned enterprises, regionally biased policies, certain pricing 
structures, political favoritism, and corruption have also contributed to the divide?' 
1.4: Creating the Gap 
As China's economic growth became increasingly fueled by its export sector, 
preferential treatment given to the urban, coastal areas helped to widen the urban - rural 
gap. The gap, expressed as a Gini ~oefficient)~ rose from .29 in 1980 to .40 in 2004.~' 
" World Bank, www.worldbank.org/cn; National Bureau of Statistics - China, 
http:llwww.stats.gov.cn/engiishJ; and UNICEF, http:llwww.unicef.orglinfobycountryl~hina~stati~ti~~.hhnl 
Terry Atlas, "World Watch: China's Growing Rich-Poor Gap," US. News and WorldReport, 
September 29,2005, http://www.usnews.com~usnewdnewdarticled050929129world.h, (accessed 
l9 The Gini coefficient is a measun of statistical dispersion developed by the Italian statistician 
Comdo Gini and published in his 1912 paper "Variability and Mutability". It is commonly used as a 
measure of inequality of income or wealth. Without delving into the calculus behind the coefficient's 
equation, simply put it compares income or wealth groupings (deciles, quartiles, etc.). The lower the Gini 
on a scale of 0 to 1, the more equal the distribution of wealth or income. Two caveats in using the measure 
include: 1) it is a "snapshot" in time and does not account for lifetime earning; and 2) depending on how a 
population is segmented, the coefficient will change - more segmentation creates a higher Gi (ex: using 
deciles as opposed to quartiles). 
Regional gaps highlighted by the urban-rural gap can be traced to the creation of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) set up in eastern coastal cities to facilitate foreign trade, and to 
the concept of regional divisions built into the sixth and seventh five-year plans of 1981- 
1985 and 1986-1990. The establishment of three economic belts - eastern (coastal), 
central and western regions - assigned roles to the regions that specified: export oriented 
industrialization for the eastern region; agriculture for the central region; and animal 
husbandry and mineral exploitation in the western region.41 
Though analysts cite subtle differences in sub-factor causes, there is little 
disagreement that the phenomenon was an expected consequence of policy decisions. 
Fan, using Chinese language sources, lists six preferential policies: I)  larger state 
investments in coastal regions; 2) creation of SEZs limited to the eastern coastal region; 
3) preferential (more flexible) tax remittance practices given to coastal areas allowing for 
greater fiscal autonomy; 4) higher wages for workers in coastal areas; 5) a "scissors-gap" 
product pricing structure where coastal areas sell high priced goods to the inland but 
receive low-priced goods kom those regions; and 6) better access to fmancial capital in 
coastal regions (better access to loans and financing as well as to private fmancial 
instit~tions).~~ 
Demurger's analysis also centers on policy initiatives but singles out 
infrastructure development, or lack thereof, as the major cause of the regional, urban- 
rural income gap. Demurger contends that the early emphasis on heavy industry allowed 
40 Ravillion, Martin and Chen Shaohua, "Learning From Success: Understanding China's (uneven) 
Progress Against Poverty," Finance and Development (December 2004), 
http:Nwww.imf.org/extem~pubs/A/fandd~2004/12/pdffmvalIio.pdf, (accessed December 5,2009). 
4' C. Cindy Fan, "Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao 
Chi~"1nfernafional Journal of Urban and Regional Research 21, no. 4 (1997): 623. 
Ibid. 625 
the coastal areas to develop better transportation and communications infrastructure. As 
Chinese planners moved to a comparative advantaged3 model, Demurger asserts that the 
planners failed to make the transportation and communications infrastructure investments 
in non-coastal regions to effectively tie the economy together." This failure effectively 
prevented any expansion of development or "trickle-down" effect to the more rural areas. 
Yang takes a more quantitative approach to the issue but once again maintains 
that central planning (heavy industry development in the tuban coastal regions at the 
expense of the agricultural sector) is the central issue. Yang's analysis substantially 
reinforces Fan's thesis but adds the factor of rural land tenure rules. These rules have a 
punitive effect on nual families who temporarily leave agriculture to work in cities as 
migrant industrial workers by not guaranteeing future land use allocations should the 
family return to agricultural.45 
Though criticism of uneven development policy can be traced to the mid-l980s, 
formal recognition and attempts to address the issue began with the Ninth Five-Year Plan 
in 1 9 9 6 . ~ ~  The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001 -2005) repeats concern for the problem. 
Included as key plan objectives to address the issue were, "Bring the development 
disparity between regions under effective control, and raise levels of urbanization," raise 
" In simple terms, comparative advantage planning leverages the economic strengths of a given 
region or area to build synergies within a national economy. The 'Wme economic belts" would be an 
example of a comparative advantage strategy. 
44 Sylvie Demurger, "lnfrastructure Development and Economic Growth: An Explanation for 
Regional Disparities in China?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Number 29 (2001). 
hnp:llw.idealibrary.com, (accessed November 10,2009). 
'' Yang, Dennis Tao, "Urban-Biased Policies and Risinn Income Ineaualitv in China." American 
Economic ~ e v i e w ,  May 1999, http:llwww.aeaweb.org/aerlco~ten~ay19&l, (accessed November 17, 
2009). 
'6 Fan. 620, 
income levels of both urban and rural citizens by 5 percent and improve medical and 
health services in both urban and rural areas.47 
1.5: Current Situation 
As early as 1996, a United Nations report warned of the rising income inequality 
gap in By 2005, Chinese media openly carried articles on the subject. A 
sampling of recent on-line economic data published by China's National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) for 2007 illustrates the nature of the gap. The national average per capita 
income of urban households was calculated at 13,785.8 RMB (approximately $1,969 US) 
while rural household net income was 4,140.4 RMB ($586 US)?' On a regional basis the 
figures become more disparate. Urban families living in the eastern coastal provinces 
averaged 16,974 RMB ($2424 US) compared to rural households of the western 
provinces whose average disposable income was calculated at 3,028 RMB ($433 US)." 
Quality of life measures follow a similar pattern to those shown for income. On 
the most basic level, spending for food as a function of total living expenses (Engel's 
Coefficient) amounted to 36.3 percent for urban residents as opposed to 43.1 percent for 
47 Letian Pan (editor), "The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005)," http://www.gov.cnlengIish/2006- 
04/05/content-245624.htm, (accessed February 20,2010). 
'* Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Survey Finds World Rich-Poor Gap Widening," New York Times, July 15, 
1996, httpJ/www.nytimes.com/1996/07/1 5lworl~-survey-finds-world-rich-poor-gap~dening.html, 
(accessed December 3,2009) 
"National Bureau of Statistics, "Table 1-6: Main Indicators of National Economic and Social 
Development by Eastern, Central, Western and Northeastern Provinces (2007): China Statistical Yearbook 
2008, http://www.stats.gov.cn~tjsj/ndsj/2008/i, (accessed March 8,2010). Note: Eastern refers 
to Shanghai, Jiangsy Zhejiang, Guangdong, Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin, Sbandong, and Fujian. Central is 
composed of Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shanxi. Western includes: Chongqing, Gansu, 
Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiaw and Yunnan. Northeast 
is Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang. 
Ibid. 
rural residents in 2007.~' Both sectors have substantially reduced this percentage since 
economic modernization began, but it is noteworthy that the urban sector passed below 
the current rural expenditure percentage in 2000. Urban and rural households spend a 
similar portion of their income on items such as household articles and services, 
healthcare, and transport and communications, but diverge, again, on educational, 
cultural and recreation services. The table below illustrates the comparison of overall 
spending patterns by category provided by the NBS. 
Item 
-
Food 
Clothing 
Residence 
Household Facilities, Articles and Services 
Health Care and Medical Services 
Transport and Communications 
Education, Cultural and Recreation Services 
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 
Total Consumption Expenditures (%)" 
Urban Rural 
-- 
36.29 43.08 
10.42 6.00 
9.83 17.80 
6.02 4.63 
6.99 6.52 
13.58 10.19 
13.29 9.48 
3.58 2.30 
51 See National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2008. Table 9-2. Note: Engel's 
Coefficient is defined as: total expenditure on food /total consumption expenditure x 100% 
52 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Table 9-7 and Table 9-25. 
Taking the assessment one step further, the next table compares ownership of select, 
durable, consumer goods between urban and rural households. 
Durable Goods: 
Item 
-
Automobile 
Washing Machine 
Color TV 
Computer 
Refigerator 
Telephone (fixed) 
Telephone (mobile) 
Units Owned per 100 ~amilies'' 
Urban 
-
Rural 
-
6.06 NIA 
96.77 45.94 
137.79 94.38 
53.77 3.68 
95.03 26.12 
90.52 68.36 
165.18 77.84 
A cursory analysis of the data provides an insight into the buying power of the 
discretionary income of the two groups which again is slanted toward the urban areas. 
In terms of basic access to health care, the eastern part of the country had one 
licensed doctor for every 598 people while the composite average of the more m l  
central and western provinces had one licensed doctor for every 713 people. Similarly, 
the eastern area had more hospital beds and clinical facilities than the total for the central 
and western regions combined. Yet the eastern population was 66 percent of the total of 
the other regions.s4 It should be noted China's Household Registration System (Hukou) 
which will be addressed later in this paper has traditionally imposed limits on access to 
healthcare programs on rural migrant workers living in urban areas. This factor would 
further skew the established statistics on healthcare access even more toward the benefit 
of the urban side. It is estimated that there as many 150 million migrant workers.55 
" National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Table 9-12 and Table 9-30. 
54 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Table 1-6. 
'' ''China's Measures on Improving People's Livelihood," hnp://english.gov.cn~2009- 
1 U27/content-l497754.htm ,(accessed March 12,201 0). 
Among other economic and development indicators from the 2008 Yearbook, the 
more urban east accounted for 55.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 56 
percent of real estate development, 89 percent of foreign trade, 54.2 percent of the value 
of domestic trade, and the highest percentage of the PRC's college graduates (40.4 
percent) of any region.56 Clearly, the official statistical data provided by the PRC 
illustrates a country that is divided by economics. Thirty years of reform and growth 
have primarily benefited the eastern section of the country but it has not translated into 
development of the entirety. As evidence, a 2005 report prepared by the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) transposed individual provincial data 
from China into the U.N.'s Human Development Index which combines factors such as 
per capita income, literacy rate and life expectancy and ranks 177 countries in total. The 
study placed the most developed areas of China - Beijing and Shanghai - on par with 
countries such as Portugal (#27) and Argentina (#34). At the bottom of the scale, the 
southwestern province of Guizhou was estimated at about the same level as the African 
country of Namibia (#125).~' 
The current Eleventh Five-Year Plan maintains a goal of balanced development 
and devotes an entire chapter to "Building a New Socialist Countryside," as well as one 
entitled, "Promoting Balanced Development Among ~ e ~ i o n s . " ~ '  Both chapters include 
dominant themes of urbanization, centrally funded infrastructure development, 
56 National Bureau of Statistics, China Sfalistical Yearbook 2008, Table 1-6. 
57 "Regional Disparities Have Gone Beyond Acceptable Limits - The Path to an All-Amund Well-off 
Society Remains Distant," Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, November 29,2005, 
http://www.rieti,go.jp/en/china/05112901.html, (accessed March 4,2010). Note: Per RIETI, citing the U.N. 
study, China's national rank on the index was 85 -virtually in the middle. 
%ational Development and Reform Commission, "T3e Outline of the Eleventh Five Year Plan," 
http://en.n~.gov.cn/hot~t20060529~71334.h (accessed December 9,2009). 
environmental protection, and the provision of social safety nets in the form of social 
security and improved access to healthcare. However, little specific detail is provided 
regarding how these objectives will be met. 
1.6: Harmonious Society - The National Response 
Those familiar with American History might fmd, the scope, positioning, and the 
national, strategic nature of "Harmonious Society" reminiscent of initiatives such as the 
1960s "Great Society" in the United ~ t a t e s ? ~  National policy statements tend to provide 
sweeping, but vague, national goals. For example, the Great Society targeted the 
elimination of poverty and racial injustice as national goals and sought to support those 
goals by formulating specific programs and entitlements to improve education, medical 
care, urban problems, and 
China's goals for Harmonious Society are identified in the "Decisions by the CCP 
Central Committee on Building Socialism and Harmonious Society, and Other Important 
Issues" by the Central Committee during the Sixth Plenum (October 2006):' The 
communiquk is short on specifics but sets a generally populist tone. In characterizing the 
goals of Harmonious Society the official Xinhua news agency reported: 
As the economy grows, people's living standards should 
increase gradually. As the essence of a harmonious society 
is affluence, the development of a country should go from 
s9 Harmonious Society in China is a by-product of reform of the economic system and the Great 
Society was a result of reforming the U.S. legal system though the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Both 
programs share the broad goal of correcting inequalities within their respective national systems. 
" Lyndon B. Johnson, "President Lyndon B. Johnson's Remarks at the University of Michigan," May 
22, 1964, http:Nw.lbjlib.utexas.eddjohn~0n~archive~.h0m/~peeches.h0m/640522~asp, ( ccessed March 
4,201 0). 
Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok, "Harmonious Society and Harmonious World: C h i ' s  Policy 
Discourse Under Hu Jintao," China Policy Institute: Briefing Series - 26, October 2007, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uklCPYpublicatioicy-pa2007/index.px, (accessed November 30, 
2009). 
being moderately well-off into being well-off and affluent; 
from having big gaps in income to narrowin gaps; from 
dealing with poverty to eliminating poverty.. . 6 9  
Excerpts from official press releases such as the one issued by the Press Office of the 
Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. provide additional detail and defme the initiative 
in the following manner: 
A harmonious society in China is a society that always puts 
people fust ... A harmonious society in China means a 
society with, for instance, a stable political environment, a 
sustainable prosperity, people living in peace with fair 
opportunities for work or study, and a society of better 
welfare ... Many programs are hence introduced with more 
resources from both public and private sectors in a bid to 
help communities improve infrastructure, enhance 
education and job training, strengthen medical care and 
clean streets and waters. The gap between rich and poor 
draws great attention and efforts are being made to narrow 
it sooner and faster?' 
The press release also mentions goals of coordinated and sustainable development, 
balancing the interests o f  different sectors, upholding the principle of governing the 
country by law and building a legal system, increasing income opportunities, perfecting a 
social security system and increasing wages in order to raise the size of the middle-class 
-all while eliminating social ills and In a twist of irony, it has been 
observed that the concept of Harmonious Society aligns closely with Confucian values 
that were the object of scorn and derision during the Cultural  evolution.^^ The 
Xinhuanef "What is a Harmonious Society," March 23,2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.c0m/english/2005-031 l/content-5278045.htm, (accessed November 28,2009) 
63 Press Office of the Chinese Embassy, "Put People First and Build a Harmonious Society in China," 
October 24,2009, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/englemrpath/t622335htm, (accessed November 11,2009) 
Ibid. 
Daniel A. Bell, ''China's Leaders Rediscover Confucianism," New York Times, September 14, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2OO6/09/14/opinion/l4iht-edbell.2807200.html, (accessed April 30,2010). 
presentation and "sale" of Harmonious Society to the Chinese public has been supported 
with quotes from Confucius in speeches by key leaders including President Hu ~ i n t a o . ~ ~  
1.7: Summary 
This chapter has endeavored to show that China's decision to pursue a path of 
modernization was due to the confluence of historical, economic, and ideological 
changes. The historical events included leadership changes from the original 
revolutionary cadres to the so-called "second, third, and fourth generation" leaders. The 
poor state of the Chinese economy, especially in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, 
necessitated economic changes. However, ideas such as the precept of self-reliance in 
the existing Maoist ideology ran counter to the needs of modernization. As ideology is a 
basis for enlisting political support and motivating people to action, especially in the 
Chinese model, aligning ideology with modernization policy was criticaL6' The 
methodology for adapting ideology - the systemization of "Deng Xiaoping Theory" and 
"The Three Represents" - accomplished the alignment objective and established a 
potential framework for future revisions, if needed.68 
Data presented illustrates that the modernization program has delivered 
phenomenal economic growth but has also generated the growing rich-poor gap. 
However, at the outset of the transition period to a market economy, levels of poverty 
were so high that income inequality was not an important concern. In a special report, 
the New York Times noted, "...as long as the rising tide of economic growth was lifting 
66 [bid. 
" Chi,  164. 
" Ibid. 169. 
all boats, the widening gap between rich and poor was generally tolerable." 69 The 
general public's perception of the definition of "poverty" has also evolved in China with 
the bar being set much higher than it was in 1978. Lean economic times, especially the 
current worldwide downturn, magnify the issue as the lower earning segments of Chinese 
society are more adversely affected and the gap is more readily apparent." 
One indicator of the growing gravity of the problem is the documentation of 
social unrest in both Chinese and international sources. A 2006 report authored by the 
Congressional Research Service noted a 50 percent rise in the social disturbances 
between 2003 and 2005 (58,000 incidents in 2003 to 87,000 in 2005) with most of the 
unrest attributed to economic conditions?' Citing Chinese officials in Hunan Province in 
March 2007, the UK Daily Mail published a report entitled "20,000 Farmers Riot in 
China over Widening Gap between Rich and ~oor ." '~  Even the July 2009 turmoil in 
Xinjiang appears to have economic as well as ethnic origins. The inciting incident is 
attributed to the lack of an official response to the violent deaths of two ethnic Uighur 
migrant workers in Guangdong. However, contributing factors appear to include income 
inequality and hiring di~crimination.'~ As recently as 24 December 2009, the annual 
report of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stated that social unrest and crime 
69 Wheatley. 
7% . . vlll~on and Chen, 19; Wheatley. 
" Thomas Lum, "Social Unrest in China," Document RL33416, (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, May 2006). 1-3. 
72 Mail Online, "20,000 Farmers Riot in China Over Widening Gap Between Rich and Poor," London 
Daily Mail, March 12,2007, hnp:Nwww.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-441748/20-000-farmers-riot-China- 
widening-gap-rich-poor.hbnl, (accessed December 9,2009). 
71 Christina Larson, "How China Wins and Loses Xinjiang," Foreign Policy, July 9,2009, 
http:Nw.foreignpolicy.com~articles/2009/07109/h0~~~hina~wins~and~I0~es~~injiang?page=0,2, 
(accessed January 3 1,2009). Note: Larson references PRC data that shows Xinjiang remains one of the 
highest in income inequality among China's provinces. 
were increasing, and the main reason given was growing income gaps, "especially the 
chronically lagging incomes in the countryside versus the richer ~ities."'~ How the CCP 
reacts in dealing with this issue may determine whether or how long it can maintain its 
monopoly on political power. 
74 Shai Oster, China Think Tank Sees More Unrest," China Realfime Report, December 24,2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/~hinarealtime/2009/12124/~hina-think-tank-~ees-mo~-~st~, (accessed January 5, 
2010). 
Chapter Two: Theory and China's Modernization 
To accomplish modernization of a Chinese type, we must proceed from China's 
special characteristics. - Deng Xiaoping 
2.1: The Broad Contexf -Modernization Theory 
Social scientists have had thirty years to analyze and evaluate China's model of 
modernization. As might be expected, a heavier volume of academic papers seem to 
cluster around the times of leadership change but the flow of work has remained fairly 
constant over the last three decades. To date, while certain trends can traced in the 
scholarly community, it is fair to state that a consensus has yet to be reached on many 
aspects of the Chinese modernization model, and especially on its long term impact. 
The most frequent areas of analysis include: 1) Why hasn't China shown some signs 
of democracy or political reform to complement the economic reforms?; 2) Does the 
Chinese modernization model fit into any current theoretical framework and is there such 
a thing as "Chinese Exceptionalism?", and 3) What type of government can one expect in 
China in both the short term and in the more distant future? 
In order to properly position a discussion of China-specific development theory, it 
is helpful to look back at some of the earlier work on development and modernization. 
Though not China-specific, the concept of linkage between economic development and 
political behavior has been both popular and debated since the nineteenth century. Since 
the 1960s, several Western theorists, Seymour Lipset and Walter Rostow in particular, 
have specifically focused the connection on the process of democratization. Lipset 
viewed the process from a sociological perspective while Rostow was an economist and 
political theorist. 
Lipset argued for a set of conditions that allow democracy to emerge. The 
conditions (more accurately, the correlation of conditions) include an acceptable level of 
wealth, urbanization, education and industrialization.' In methodology, common 
r 
economic and demographic measures (per capita income, percentage of agricultural 
workers, educational attainment levels, urban versus rural residence) are used to quantify 
the topical categories.' However, acceptable levels of the factors needed to promote 
democratic transition are not absolutely defined. Rather, comparisons between "stable 
democracies" and dictatorships are utilized to illustrate how democracies have 
considerably higher scores in the four categories.3 
Rostow, in theorizing "The Five Stages of Economic Growth," added economic 
content to the theory. The five stages include: "1) traditional society - one whose 
structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian 
science and technology; 2) pre-conditions for take-off (emphasis on building an effective 
centralized national state); 3) take-off - the interval when the old blocks and resistances to 
steady growth are fmally overcome; 4) drive to maturity - a long interval of sustained if 
fluctuating progress; and 4) the age of mass consumption - leading sectors shift towards 
durable consumers' goods and services.'* 
' Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1, (1 959), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.shu.edu/stabIe/l95 173 1, (accessed January 2 1, 
2010), 75. Note: Lipset defmes democracy as a "political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials." (See page 71) 
Ibid, 76. 
' Lipset provides charts of data on pages 76-77. 
4 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), Chapter 2, "The Five Stages of Growth--A Summary," 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu~acad~intreVipe/rosto~.hbn, (accessed February 28,201 0). 
Criticism of Modernization Theory centers on several issues consisting of its 
perceived Eurocentric -American bias, its Cold War / anti-communist orientation, a 
tendency to "package" factors, and minimizing the contributions of non-western people. 
On the issue of Eurocentric - American bias, Dean Tipps observed, "Certainly, by virtue 
of its overriding concern with political stability, its often explicit anti-Communism, and 
its indifference to the entire issue of economic and political imperialism, there is little in 
the modernization literature that would seriously disturb White House, Pentagon, or State 
Department policymakers."5 Reinforcing his criticism, Tipps also notes that many of the 
academics associated with the theoly were also consultants to the U.S. State Department, 
CIA or other government agency.6 Regarding criticism of its Cold War orientation, Colin 
Leys notes a "pro-capitalist" orientation that aligns with the objectives of United States 
foreign policy supported by European allies? Tipps and Jane Jaquette take the 
"packaging" to task as a structural issue arguing that the attributes need not be introduced 
in the manner the Modernization Theorists specify. They contend that the factors 
(industrialization, urbanization, etc.) may be "unbundled and absorbed ~elect ivel~."~ The 
linear constructs of both Lipset and Rostow would fall under this criticism. 
The minimization of indigenous people and women is addressed by Jaquette and 
Arif Dirlik. Jaquette notes that the theoly either ignores or categorizes women as a 
Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society andHistory IS, no. 2 (March 1973): 210. 
6 Rostow, for example, served as President John Kennedy's National Security Advisor. 
7 Colin Leys, "The Rise and Fall of Development Theory," in Marc Edeleman and Angelique 
Haugemd, The Anthropology ofDevelopment and Globalization, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd, 
ZOOS), 1 12. 
8 Tipps, 215, and Jane S. Jaquette, "Review: Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of 
Feminist Criticism," World Politics 34, no. 2 (January 1982): 268. 
"backward element," and Dirlik adds that using capitalism and ignoring local custom and 
practice as the basis for the theory is antithetical to Post-Colonialist intellectuals? 
Clearly, there are flaws in the theory subject to criticisms such as the ones 
presented. Rostow, for example, does indeed support the five stages with illustrations 
from the American experience. However, the purpose in presenting Modernization 
Theory is due to its influence on several of the theorists whose ideas will be presented 
later in this paper, Lucian Pye and Samuel Huntington among them. Vestiges of the 
theory can also be seen in the work of contemporay scholar Minxin pei.lo 
Additionally, the democratization of governments in South Korea and Taiwan 
have sparked a resurgence of interest in the theory as both transitions followed extended 
periods of economic development. In 1997, Francis Fukuyama commented, ''there are in 
fact good empirical grounds for thinking that modernization is a coherent process that 
produces a certain uniformity of economic and political institutions across different 
regions and cu~tures."'~ Supporting Fukyama's assertion, research presented in 2004 by 
Adam Przeworski found that no democracy that has reached a per capita income of 
$6,055 ($US) has ever fallen while forty-seven poorer democracies have failed since 
1946." Political economist Robert Barn arrived at a similar conclusion in 1999 research 
9 Jaquette, 269 and Arif Dulik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global 
Capitalism," Crtical Inquiry20, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 335. 
'%hen Berman, "What to Read on Modernization Theory," Foreign Affairs, March 12,2009, 
h~p://www.foreign~airs.com/features/readin~i~ts/what-to-read-~n-modemization-theory, (accessed 
February 6,2010). Note: Berman's reading list includes selections from Huntington. Pei's book, China's 
Trapped Transition is dedicated to Samuel Huntington. See also, Mark T. Berger, "Decolonisation, 
Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in 
Southeast Asia, 1945-1 975," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (2003): 42 1-448. 
I I  Francis Fukuyama, "The Illusion of Exceptionalism," Journal of Democracy 8 ,  no. 3 (1997): 146. 
l 2  Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," 
ht~Jlas.nyu.edu~doc~O/2800/sisson.pdf (accessed Febmary 28,2010) 
that found, "more prosperous places are more likely to be democratic."" A dissenting 
view is held by Acemoglu, et al. In their analysis of former European colonies, the 
positive correlation between income and democracy is only present over a 500 year span 
but disappears in a 100 year review when historical factors influencing both political and 
economic development are included.I4 
2.2: Connecting Economic Reform to Political Reform 
A recent feature article on China appearing in The Economist asked as its 
title,"What are they afraid of?"'5 The article, noting political stability and economic 
growth, proceeded to document a series of repressive moves against political dissent. 
The question posed by The Economist is something of a subset of the "why not 
democracy?" question.. Neither question seems to have an easy answer. Positions on 
political reform range from pessimistic to guardedly optimistic. The reasoning behind the 
positions varies from cultural antipathy toward democratization to characterizing lack of 
reform as an event that may come at some future, unpredictable, date. 
More optimistic views of potential political reform and possible democratization 
were found in the 1990s, but continued forward into the fmt years of the twenty-fust 
century. Rapid economic growth anticipated the rise of the middle class. In theory, the 
emerging middle class would recognize democratic processes, institutions and the rule of 
law as fundamental values and thus the group would become the agent of political 
l 3  Robert J. Barm, ''Determinants of Democracy," The Journal oflolitical Economy 107, no. 6, Part 
2: Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Social Behavior in Honor of Gary S. Becker (December 1999): 
S166. 
14 D a m  Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, "Income and 
Democracy, " Unpublished Paper (Febmq 2005), 
http:Nwww.people.fas.hmmd.edu~-jmb'ms/re~em~hpapers/unp~bIi~hedpaperdjr~IncomeDem~~fil~y.pdf, 
(accessed February 2 1,20 10). 
'%'hat are they a h i d  of? The Politics of Repression in China," The Economist, February 20,2010, 
37. 
change.16 To date, the predicted assertion of the middle class has yet to materialize. With 
little discernible activity on the national level, most literature citing political reform is 
focused on the local level. 
Kevin J, O'Brien and Lianjiang Li studied the history of the limited experiment in 
village elections between 1980 and 2000. While their study emphasizes that village 
elections have no bearing on national policy, their fmdings are still of interest. Over the 
twenty year period they conclude that village elections went flom creating a form of 
grassroots democracy initially with limited scope to a semi-institutionalized and accepted 
practice.'7 Though acknowledging the limitations of the local elections, they see the 
practice as a "tantalizing sign" of reform at higher levels of government.'8 Baogang He 
came to a similar conclusion after observing village assemblies in 2001. He observed 
that villagers used the village assembly as a check on party power, village decision- 
making and to fight official corruption resulting in a government that was "more 
balanced and more responsive to the needs of villagers."19 
The intellectual middle ground of the state of Chinese political reform recognizes 
that China is still ruled under an authoritarian system but concurrently fmds reasons for 
varying degrees of optimism.20 Andrew Nathan, for example, cites as positive, policy 
andfor institutional changes: "1) the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession 
l6 Gongqin Xiao, "The Rise of the Technocrats," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 63. 
I1 Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State: 
Introducing Village Elections in China," The China Quarterly 162, Special Issue: Elections and Democracy 
in Greater China, (June 2000): 487. 
'' bid, 489. 
l9 Baogong He, "The Theory and Practice of Chinese Grassmots Governance," Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 4, No. 2: 309. 
'%e middle ground position is reminisent of James M m ' s  "Soothing Scenario" described earlier in 
this paper. 
politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the 
promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and functional specialization of 
institutions within the regime; and 4) the establishment of institutions for political 
participation and appeal."21 While Nathan speculates that these may be positive signs for 
future reform, he also cautions that the resiliency shown by the CCP may suggest that 
"authoritarianism is a viable regime form even under conditions of advanced 
modernization and integration with the global economy."22 
Hany Harding, also writing within the middle of the theoretical spectrum, takes 
the position that China is a "soft" or consultative form of authoritarian system.u Echoing 
several of Nathan's "positives," Harding adds that China is "a far fieer society (than 
thirty years ago), with a more extensive and effective legal system, and a narrower 
political spectrum, in which most political debate is over the details of policy rather than 
the overall course of He concludes that China of 2009 is ''very different than 
it was in 1978 - certainly more pragmatic and liberal, even if neither pluralistic nor 
democrati~."~~ 
The more pessimistic scholars group around a position that Minxin Pei describes 
as "political decay."26 Bruce Gilley, who is also representative of the pessimistic group, 
maintains that while others may interpret orderly succession and perceived merit based 
21 Andrew Nathan, "Authoritarian Resilience," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003). 6. 
22 Ibid, 16. 
23 Hany Harding, 'Thirty Years of Political Reform in China," April 23,2009, 
hnp://thinkingaboutasiabIogspot.co~OO9IO4/ulirty-years-of-po1itical-refom-innhtml, (accessed February 
27,2009). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Minxin Pei, "Contradictory Trends and Confusing Signals," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 
(January 2003), 78. 
promotions as institutionalizing the rule of the CCP, the level of institutionalization is 
"faint and unlikely to ~tren~then."~' Gilley offers as support for his thesis research that 
has shown: 
China's anti-crime campaigns that boast high conviction rates violate due process 
which the state is simultaneously promoting. 
The orderly transition of leadership power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao "had 
more to do with the powerful legacy of Deng Xiaoping than it did with 
institutionalization." (Deng had effectively anointed Hu in 1992.) 
Meritocracy may be present in the lower levels of government, but seven of the 
nine top leadership positions in 2003 could be traced to factional or personal 
loyalty as opposed to outstanding performance.28 
Gilley's summary characterization is that "the problems traditionally associated with non- 
democratic regimes-illegitimacy, misgovernment, corruption, and elite instability 
remain legion in Gilley leaves open the option that reform may still occur but 
it may happen due to negative events that build a coalition of stakeholder groups - not as 
a progressive initiative of the presently constituted CCP. 
Yet another position on the pessimistic side of reform suggests thai a further 
ideological shift is underway. This viewpoint observes that the current administration of 
Hu Jintao has signaled a shift back to a more orthodox, Leninist position. Tony Saich 
notes that Hu's policies have diverged from those of his predecessor by being "more 
people-centered," but he has also tightened control over dissent in the name of "preserving 
social stability as the key foundation for continued economic gro~th ."~  As a further 
27 Bruce Gilley, "The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience," Journol of Democracy 14, no. I (January 
2003): 18. 
28 Ibid, 20-21. 
29 Ibid, 23. 
'O Tony Saich, "Governance and Politics of China," Web Update, 
http:Nwww.palgrave.com/politicdsaich~dwdupdate1.pdff (accessed January 17,2010). 
indication of a more orthodox leaning, Saich associates Hu with the traditional CCP 
leadership position that "China will never follow a "Westem" model of dem~cracy."~' 
The sampling of literature in this section, though hardly exhaustive, illustrates the 
lack of consensus among scholars as to why the limited freedoms of economic reform have 
not blossomed into more comprehensive political reforms. There appears to be relative 
agreement, even among the pessimists, that potential for reform does exist, but the 
motivations for it happening differ considerably. 
2.3: "Chinese Exceptionalism?" 
China's rise as an economic power has provoked considerable comparisons to 
other regional development situations. Unlike the former Soviet bloc, China has 
followed a path of gradualism and has maintained its one-party rule. The rapidity and 
seeming uniqueness of its transition from a poor, undeveloped country to a global 
economic power has led some to question if the uniqueness constitutes a case of 
"exceptionalism." 
The theory of Chinese Exceptionalism also falls under the hmework of East 
Asian Exceptionalism. In considering the development of other Asian countries, the term 
refers to economic reform preceding political reform. In China (and Vietnam), the 
defmition is modified to mean economic reform without political reform. In either case, 
all the players started with authoritarian political regimes. The intellectual discussion 
concerning the political aspect of the term most often devolves into a debate regarding 
the relationship between regime type and the sequencing and effectiveness of economic 
reform. Randall Peerenbloom and Weitseng Cheng outline the East Asian Model as a 
five phase process that starts with economic growth and evolves to constitutionalism. In 
" Ibid. 
between the fxst and fifth phases countries experience pragmatic reforms, investment in 
human capital that builds institutions of civil society followed by some form of 
democrati~ation.~~ Citing Taiwan and South Korea as recent examples of how East Asian 
countries move from authoritarianism to hnctioning democracy, the authors use Taiwan 
in particular as a possible role model for China. 
In related research, Pei observes that "highly publicized booms" associated with 
economic restructuring in authoritarian or communist states such as China convey an 
impression of what one might call "autocratic superiority." 33 The implication of the term 
is that placing market-oriented reforms ahead of democratization is the better alternative. 
Though the absolute results seemingly speak for themselves, Pei contends that other 
factors reduce the superiority claim to the category of "simple generalization.'"'4 
However, he does concede that authoritarian rule does minimize or eliminate the 
problems that a democratic regime faces from economic issues when dealing with an 
e~ectorate.~' Though Pei rejects the concept of autocratic superiority by placing greater 
weight on factors such as giving priority to comparative advantage sectors such as 
agriculture, promoting an export economy to link to the world economy and avoiding 
ideological battles, he does lend credence to aspects of the concept of exceptionalism. 
One of the principal reasons is his assessment that the somewhat unique, "transnational 
32~andall Peerenbloom and Weitseng Chen, "Developing the Rule of Law: Political Change in 
China." in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond (editors), Political Change in China, (Boulder, CO: Lynn 
Riemer Publishers, 2008), 136-1 37. 
" Minxin Pei, 'The Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 4 (October 
1994): 91. 
l4 Ibid. 
'' Ibid. 
character of China and East Asia's entrepreneurial society"36 facilitated the movement of 
capital across national borders?' 
While Pei's work addresses political theory, Wing Thye Woo approaches the 
question of exceptionalism f?om the perspective of China's economic model. His 
fmdings, like the political analysis of Pei, are mixed. The economic elements identified 
as "exceptional" include: dual-track pricing, state-owned enterprise (SOE) contracts, and 
fiscal contracts.38 Woo theorizes that if China's model is indeed exceptional, then WTO 
membership would pose an impediment to increased growth since post-accession, certain 
key elements of the model would have to conform to WTO requirements.39 In part, 
Woo's fmdings indicate part of China's claims of success due to economic model 
exceptionalism is actually attributable to privatization of certain sectors and not to dual 
hack pricing or to labor contracts.40 On the positive side, fiscal contracts that allow local 
governments to invest in local development are highlighted by his paper.41 
Fukuyarna explores the concept of cultural exceptionalism. China's historical 
concept of the "Middle Kingdom" as well as its contemporary surges of nationalism lend 
credibility to a sense of cultural exceptionalism, but Fukuyama tends to take a more 
negative position. He notes that some East Asian cultures contend that Confucian 
"Transnational" in this usage refers to linkage with an overseas diaspora, especially with regard to 
capital flows and business networks. 
" Ibid, 95. 
'' Wing Thye Woo, "Recent Claims of China's Economic Exceptionalism: Reflections inspired by 
WTO Accession," China Economic Review 12 (2001): 107. 
'9 Ibid. 
40 Ihid, 11 5 ,  
'' Ibid. 127. 
tradition lends itself to favoring a "certain kind of political authoritariani~m."~~ His 
counter argument, however, cites "Chinese and other Asian communities in Canada, 
Britain, and the United States remain in some deep sense culturally Asian within the 
context of a modem democracy.'"3 
Summarizing the literature reviewed on exceptionalism, one finds elements of the 
concept in the political, economic, and social theoretical writing. Transnationalism, as 
defmed by Pei, appears to be a valid argument while economic models and social 
perceptions of the concept are open to debate. 
2.4: Possible Governing Options 
Scholarly literature addressing the answer to future governing options is often 
couched in disclaimer. No literature predicted the near term demise of communist party 
control and those authors who did venture ideas on a potential form did so in broad terms. 
The more common analysis ventured at predicting characteristics and elements of future 
governing styles. A representative commentary is embodied in the following analysis by 
Shaun Breslin. 
In recent years, debates over political reform and the need 
to democratise (albeit to democratise with Chinese 
characteristics) have been at the forefront of political 
debates amongst intellectuals - many of them with close 
links to the Pa @...When the Chinese talk about 
democratisation, what they are really referring to is making 
the existing one-party state more democratic - increasing 
transparency, predictability and the rule of law - and more 
efficient.44 
4 Fukuyama, 148. 
4' Ibid, 148. 
Sham Breslin, "Democratising One-Party Rule? Political Reform, Nationalism and Legitimacy in 
the People's Republic of Chin%" Working Paper 67, www.fride.org, (accessed February 27,2010). 
Hany Rowen opted to propose a timetable related to the Freedom House Index. 
In an article written in 2007 that was an updated version of one published in 1996, 
Rowen maintains that China will earn a "partly free" score by 2015, and achieve a "free" 
grade by 2025.~' Rowen's basis for the prediction is the continuing rise in per capita 
income. He aligns with theory of Lipset and cites the empirical work of John Barro and 
Adam Przeworski in support. While Rowen's paper may be classified as optimistic, he 
adds the necessary cautions that external or internal events could derail the process. 
Bruce Dickson, while not predicting government form or setting a timetable, 
shares research thoughts on the continued adaptation of the CCP. Dickson notes, 
The Party has been recruiting the kind of economic and 
technical expertise needed to promote economic 
modernization. The rationale here is itself two-fold: First, 
the CCP wants to be connected with the types of people it 
needs to achieve continued growth, which is a main source 
of the Party's contemporary claim to legitimate rule.46 
Dickson attributes the recruiting to "party building" that maintains relevance in a 
changing world and, ultimately, preempting the new elites from forming potentially rival 
Gabriella Montinola, et al, provide more specific guidance in their paper by 
proposing a concept of "Federalism, Chinese Style." The main tenet of this theoretical 
approach asserts that "democratization does not encompass all aspects of political 
'* Hany S. Rowen, ''When Will the Chinese People be Free?," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (July 
2007): 38. 
" Dickson, 28. 
47 [bid. 
reform.'*' They contend that economic reforms have essentially "enhanced the powers 
of local government and altered central-local government relations in several critical 
ways that are difficult, though not impossible, to reverse.'*9 The resulting style of 
government in their model is a power sharing scheme that basically leaves local decisions 
at the local level but maintains the CCP as the central authority. As evidence that the 
system already exists in an informal sense, the authors cite the relative operating freedom 
in terms of taxing authority and development policy of local governments in SEZS.~' 
The work of one other author, Yongnian Zheng, is worthy of consideration. 
Zheng, whose article is now somewhat dated, addresses the possibility of China adopting 
a neo-authoritarian form of government. Considering the failure at Tiananmen, Zheng 
reflected in 1994, that there was significant sentiment among "scholars and many 
politicians, both old and young" that China needs an authoritarian Zheng 
discusses several options including federalism and full western style democracy. 
However, based on public opinion data he concludes that the public default position leans 
toward an authoritarian model. As his empirical data shows economic issues at the 
forefront of the Chinese public, he reasons: "An authoritarian system is more likely than 
a democratic one to be compatible with greater economic equality among different 
regions and individua~s."~~ Though neo-authoritarianism fell out favor during the more 
liberal Jiang Zemin administration, the significance of Zheng's conclusion has interesting 
18 Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The 
Political Basis for Economic Success," WorldPolitics Volume 48, no. 1 (1996): 51. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, 62. 
5' Yongnian Zheng, "Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?,"Political 
Science Quarterly 109, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 236. 
52 lbid, 258. 
consequences for this paper and its discussion of the impact of economic inequality on 
policy formulation. 
2.5: Summary 
The presentation of theory provides a possible framework for later evaluation of 
the policies that will be discussed in the next chapter. Modernization Theory, though 
subject to critique for its perceived pro-Western bias, is offered as a benchmark to assess 
the possible outcomes of China's modernization. "Chinese Exceptionalism" provides a 
possible alternative since it is "China-specific." The "East Asian Model" that includes 
Taiwan and features countries that have moved fiom authoritarianism to democracy by 
way of economic development is yet another possible construct for comparison purposes. 
A recapitulation of the scholarly literature reviewed in this section fmds that there 
is a conspicuous unknown nature to the future of Chinese politics and government. Most 
authors appear to see change on the horizon but qualifying it is elusive. The opinion on 
"what comes next," varies fiom reformation of the communist party to a potential 
wholesale change in the governing structure. As with the passages on theory, scholarly 
literature in this section provides a basis for comparison and will be used in the 
concluding chapter to test the adaptable ideology thesis. 
Chapter Three: Policy Case Studies 
3.1: Case Study Methodology 
The policy of Harmonious Society is now approaching its fifth year. Evaluating 
the current successes andlor failures of the initiative is outside of the scope and is not the 
* 
purpose of this research. However, analyses of selected sub-programs that support 
multiple goals of the initiative provide an indication of ideological direction or possible 
paradigmatic shift. Therefore, the next three sections will examine separate programs 
that have remediation of some aspect of the rich-poor gap as a main objective. The 
programs can be also seen as part of, or absorbed under, the general heading of 
Harmonious Society. Programs analyzed will mirror three of the objectives of 
Harmonious Society: migrant worker equality, rule-of-law, and regional economic 
development. Elements presented in this chapter include: 1) the program objectives; 2) 
the official rationale or ideological justification (if any); and 3) the desired economic, 
social or political impact of each program. 
This paper's introduction posed an initial research question that asked how 
Chinese leadership will manage balancing an objective of continued economic growth 
with narrowing the rich-poor gap. The short case studies presented provide answers to 
that question and will also provide qualitative data for evaluating of this paper's thesis of 
adaptable ideology as the key element to Chinese planning strategy. The choice of 
subject matter was relatively random but in order to avoid undue bias from any single 
discipline or domestic factor a representative cross-section of information from programs 
targeting diverse domestic sectors was assembled. Structurally, the content is presented 
in a descriptive form and a more in-depth analysis of the data will follow in chapter four. 
3.2: Legkloting a Policy of Social Change - Reforming the Hukou System 
"It is not easy to realize how strange it is when you live in an existing system, 
but when you have the chance to talk with people !?om other countries, you 
realize the huge difference ... I enjoyed my talk with my great fiiends tonight, 
and we talked about the Resident Permit (Hukou) system in China. To be honest, 
I didn't feel it too strange before I explained it with my own mouth. After that, 
even I think it is not reasonable at all, and astonished to hear what came out of 
my own mouth." - Wang Jiamhuo, Chinese   logger' 
Household registration systems or hukou (P R )  have existed in China since 
imperial times. Earliest versions can be traced fiom the Warring States Period (475 BCE- 
221 BCE) to the Baojia of the Ming (1368 - 1644 CE) and fmally to the modem forms 
used in the twentieth century by both the Nationalists (on the Mainland and on Taiwan) 
and the CCP.' Historically, the household registration (or perhaps more accurately 
defmed as a residency permit) has sewed an assortment of purposes including providing 
data for taxation, aiding law enforcement powers, determining available manpower for 
military conscription and, in its current iteration, maintaining a.desired balance (and 
control) in the geographic spread of population.3 The main reasons given for migration 
that the system regulates include: surplus labor in rural areas and the rural-urban income 
gap. Age (usually less than thirty-five), gender (predominantly male), and marital status 
(single) are important variables in the migration decision? 
In their observations of the current hukou, developed and promulgated in the 
1950s, Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden assert that the PRC version of hukou was 
' Wang Jianshuo, "Hukou System in China," 
http:/~ome.wangjianshuo.com/archived2006061O~hukou~system~in~china.htm, (accessed March 26, 
2010). 
* Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System," 
The China Quarterly, N m m b  139 (September 1994): 648. 
' Fairbank and Goldman, 297; Cheng and Selden, 644. 
I Zhong Zhao, "Migration, Labor Market Flexibility, and Wage Determination in China: A Review," 
The Developing Economies 43, no. 2 (June 2005): 300. 
established to control population movement, especially to restrict in-migration to urban 
areas as a means to manage urban unemployment, enforce permanent exile of urban 
residents sent to the countryside, and institute population controls to facilitate 
collectivization.' Fei-ling Wang describes the PRC hukou as "an administrative system 
with sketchy legal foundations ... designed to collect and manage the information of 
citizens' personal identification, kinship and legal residence and two 'unique missions': to 
control internal migration through managing temporary residentslvisitors; and to have a 
tiered management of zhongdian renkou (targeted people) in the population.'" Peter 
Alexander and Anita Chan pointedly characterize the system as rural-urban "apartheid," 
creating a system of "cities with invisible  wall^."^ 
As the system blocks free movement from rural to urban areas but does not have 
similar prohibitions regarding urban to rural movement, the policy has been identified as 
a factor underlying the current rich-poor gap.' Cheng and Selden observe, "the hukou 
system made it possible to bind China's rural population in a subaltern position on land it 
did not own and could not leave.'" At the same time, urban areas received an assortment 
of social services (including health care and education) and subsidies that were not 
5 Cheng and Selden, 645. 
Fei-ling Wang, "Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's Hukou System in 
the 2000s." The China Quarterly, Number 177 (March 2004): 117. 
' Peter Alexander and Anita Chan, "Does C h i  Have an Apartheid Pass System?" Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 30, No. 4 (2004): 609; Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, "Is China 
Abolishing the Hukou System?," The China Quarterly 195 (September 2008): 583. 
8 Dennis Tao Yang, "What Has Caused Regional Inequality in China?," China Economic Review 13 
(2002): 332; Cheng and Selden, 652; Wang, 116. 
9 Cheng and Selden, 668. 
similarly provided to rural areas that, in Maoist terms, were expected to be self- 
suficient." 
With the reforms of the 1980s, the system was relaxed to some extent but blogger 
Wang Jianshuo cites that migrants have continued problems with access to state 
subsidized medical insurance, job discrimination, and personal safety as residual impacts 
of the system." The observations made in the blog post align closely with conclusions of 
a 2005 study done using data from the cities of Harbin, Changsha and Yinzhou which 
found that migrant workers were considered a burden to the locality (by local officials 
interviewed) and that antidiscrimination policies in the areas of education, health care 
and employment were loosely interpreted and selectively enforced by local officia~s.'~ 
In March 2010, China Real Time Report, an internet affiliate of the Wall Street 
Journal, published an article illustrating one of the everyday frustrations of the system. 
The article, entitled "The Trials of Migrant Schools in Beijing," addressed the issue of 
education for the children of migrant workers.I3 The story is set in Cuigezhuang village 
which is outside the Fifth Ring Road in northeast Beijing. It was the home to migrant 
workers and their families who did much of the manual labor developing facilities for the 
2008 Olympics. The authors recount that the area's population was once around 30,000 
l o  Ibid, 645. 
" Wang Jianshuo. 
Gloria Davies and Gaby Ramia, 'Governance Reform towards Serving Migrant Workers: The 
Local Implementation of Central Government Regulations:' China Quarterly 193, (March 2008): 140-149. 
Note: An interesting finding of the study was the common complaint by locd officials of "funded 
mandates." It appears that some of the same IocaVnational disputes over budgetary funding are as 
common to China as they are to the United States and other Western countries as they attempt to legislate 
social reform. 
'' Sky Canaves and Sue Feng, "The Trials of Migrant Schools in Beijing," China Real Time Report, 
March 5,2010, http://b1ogs.wsj.com/~hinarealtimd2010/03/05/the-hial~-0f-migrant-~~hoo1~-in-beijinB/, 
(accessed April 1,2010). 
but now it is almost empty due to evacuation on orders kom the local government which 
is clearing Cuigezhuang in an urban renewal plan. Part of the urban renewal plan calls 
for the demolition of schools used by the migrant children. The article documents that 
"across the capital, a total of around thirty migrant schools serving 10,000 students are 
threatened by development plans, representing 10 percent Beijing's estimated 300 
migrant schools. Of the total, only sixty-four are licensed."I4 
The school closures add to an already difficult situation for migrant parents. In 
order to send their children to the local public schools in cities such as Beijing, they must 
pay non-resident fees that most cannot afford. The only other local choice is the 
unlicensed "private" schools (which are unprotected in urban development). The 
remaining option is to send children back to their hometowns to be educated where they 
have their hukou. In the last option, due to work obligations and travel costs and 
distances, parents can only manage to see their children once a year usually during the 
Lunar New Year holiday.'5 
A 2002 report of the The China Business Review listed the following issues as 
typical problems faced by migrant workers:I6 
Laborers do not have contracts with their employers and have limited negotiating 
power for working conditions and pay due to surplus labor supply. 
Long / Illegal work hours (average 1 1 to 12 hours per day, seven days per week - 
China's Labor Law guarantees workers 8-hour workdays, 40-hour workweeks, and 
at least one day off per week). 
Migrant wages are often well below the local legal minimum wage. 
The majority of migrant laborers do not enjoy benefits such as medical insurance 
and social welfare services to which citizens with a local hukou are entitled. 
'' Ibid. 
Ibid. 
l6 Zhang Ye, Joe Young and Virginia A Hulme, "Hope for China's Migrant Women Workers," The 
China Business Review 29, no. 3 (MayIJun 2002): 30. 
Workplace injuries and exposure to industrial hazards. 
Most nonstate-owned factories are non-union; no organized advocate to ensure 
rights. 
The report also noted that female workers are especially prone to workplace sexual 
harassment and discrimination. 
3.3: Private Properly Rights and the Rich-Poor Cap 
Only when people's lawful property is well protected will they have the 
enthusiasm to create more wealth and will China maintain its economic 
development ... 
- Jiang Ping, former president of the China University of Political Science and Law 
The story of private property reform in China is similar to several other aspects of 
the rich-poor gap issue. Like the basic market reforms, the early stages of private 
property rights began in the urban coastal areas." As market reforms progressed during 
the 1970s and 1980s, control of enterprises and their assets (including worker housing) 
became increasingly, though informally, decentralized." In the decentralized 
environment, urban land, whether rented or transferred, became a marketable commodity 
since local governments could grant land use leases for up to fifty years.f9 
The ensuing waves of business privatization created a similar market for urban 
housing in the 1990s .~~  Apartments previously owned by now privatized SOEs were sold 
to workers who, after a nominal waiting period of five years, were able to sell them at a 
" Naughton (a), 118. 
Ibid. Note: Naughton comments that the delegation of authority came about due to the proliferation 
of small enterprises that were too numerous to be managed by the central government. While in theory the 
state still owned these enterprises and their assets, a de faclo system of property rights emerged with 
control vesting at the local level. 
I9 bid, 119. 
10 Carl T. Delfeld, "China Passes Law Bolstering Private Property Rights," Seeking Alpha, March 27, 
2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3081 O-china-passes-law-bolstering-private-pmperty-rights, (accessed 
March 23,2010). 
substantial profit.2' Along with the potential for fmancial gain derived from the sale of 
housing, another study found that private ownership of housing and, specifically, untying 
of housing from state employment allowed workers greater mobility to move from state 
jobs to more lucrative ventures in the private sector.22 In essence, urban property policies 
facilitated wealth creation for residents. 
The history of rural land rights varies considerably from the urban experience. 
Whereas urban property rights were administered by bureaucrats who reported directly to 
the central government hierarchy, in rural areas agricultural collectives owned the land 
(in theory) as well as any non-agricultural businesses occupying the landF3 A formal 
system of property rights did not exist. Rather, after de-collectivization individual 
farmers negotiated and contracted with local authorities for land use leases." Re- 
distribution of land, usually based on demographic changes or production needs, was 
common in most areas, but the re-distribution activities do not appear to have caused 
farmers to become land~ess?~ Land registration regulations were promulgated in the 
1980s and 1990s, but the ownership language in the regulations has been characterized as 
"ambiguous" to allow for administrative flexibility in the developing economy.26 
Privatization brought benefits of a marketable commodity (sale of private 
housing) and greater flexibility in employment choices to urban residents, but the lack of 
" Naughton (a), 123. 
Lakshmi lyer, Xin Meng, Nancy Qian, "Unbundling Property Rights: Urban Housing Privatization 
and Labor Mobility in China," Working Paper, February 2009, 
http:lligov.berkeley.eddChi~09papers/Unbund1ing%20Prope~20Right~.pdf, (accessed March 23, 
2010). 
" Naughton (a), 119. 
" Ibid, 120. 
25 Peter Ho, "Who Owns the Land?," The China Quarterly, Number 166 (June 2001): 397. 
26 Ibid. 414. 
defined property rights in the countryside denied those same benefits to rural dwellers. 
Land cannot be used as lending collateral (urban housing can) and the rural market for 
land use rights has been slow to develop.27 Urban sprawl and expropriation of land for 
village development projects fiuther complicated matters and has fueled resentment in 
rural comtnunitie~.~~ Official reports vary, but it is estimated between 40 million and 60 
million farmers lost their land due to urbanization between 1990 and 2 0 0 7 . ~ ~  
The problem of land expropriation, though perhaps linked more to a person's 
livelihood in the nual areas, can also be found in the cities. Author and journalist 
Duncan Hewin recounts the story of a fiiend h m  Beijing whose family home was 
claimed in a development project. His friend, Mr. Zhao, had lived in his Mig-era house 
for over f i f t y  years. It was located in one of the old hutong sections of Beijing that would 
be a cultural landmark in many of the developed nations of the world.30 While Mr. Zhao, 
an octogenarian retiree, would eventually be moved to an apartment in another part of the 
city, a three generation family home and a piece of history were lost in exchange for 
minimal compensation to the owner and a parking lot for deve~o~ers .~ '  
Atter five years of debate and revision, China enacted its current private property 
law in March 2007. As most classical economists regard secure private property rights as 
a fundamental principle for a genuine market economy, the passage of the law is a 
27 Naughton (a), I20 
Xiaolin Guo, 'Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China," China Quartedy, Number 166 
(June 2001): 423. 
29 Matthew S. Erie, "China's (Post-) Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of the 
Property Law on Illegal Land Takings," Hong KongLaw Journal 37, No. 3 (2007): 921. 
Duncan Hewitt, China: Getting Rich First, (New York: Pegasus Books, LLC, 2008), 6 
" Ibid. 
significant step in China's stated goal to continue along its market-based course.32 At the 
same time, liberalizing private property rights represents a clear divergence from the 
ideology of collectivism that is a major tenet of socialism and was the official policy of 
the PRC dating back to shortly after its founding in 1949.~' 
The process that has brought China to this point is both a reflection of its on- 
going modernization process as well as a window into the workings of its leadership. A 
timeline of significant events leading up to passage of the new law includes the 
1978: The collective system is dismantled in the countryside and replaced 
with the Household Responsibility System. Agricultural collectives allocated 
land use rights to individual households while retaining ownership of the 
land. As part of the agreement, families are required to meet salesfproduction 
goals. 
1984: Time limit of fifteen years established for family land use rights. 
1988: Articles Ten and Eleven of the Constitution revised by Seventh 
National Peoples Congress (NPC) to permit transfers of land use rights and to 
officially allow the private sector to exist as "a complement to the socialist 
economy." 
1992-93: Article Fifteen of the Constitution changed from "state practices a 
planned economy" to "state practices a socialist market economy." 
1993: Land tenure rights extended to thirty years. 
1998: Land Management Law mandated all levels of government to 
formulate land management plans. To discourage expropriation for 
commercial purposes, required that 80 percent of land be reserved as "basic 
arable land protection zones" (any encroachment requires State Council 
approval). Absent were specific rights of the land user. 
12 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 3 1 .  
33 Edward Cody, "Chinese Lawmakers Approve Measures to Protect Private Property Rights: 
Washington Post, March 17,2007, http://www.washingtonpst.com/wp- 
dyn/contenWarticle/2007/03/16/ARZ00703 16005 12.htm1, (accessed March 16,201 0). 
l4 List is a composite of Erie, 927-928 and Kellee Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 67-68. 
1999: Article Eleven of Constitution amended to include, "Individual, private 
and other non-public economies ...are major components of the socialist 
market economy." 
2002: Rural Land Contracting Law becomes the first PRC law to deal 
exclusively with issues of rural land tenure and first to codify specific land 
user rights, particularly fair compensation for land lawfully expropriated. 
2004: Article Eleven of Constitution amended to read, "The state protects the 
lawful rights and interests of the private sector." Article Thirteen introduces 
the idea,".. .the lawful private property of citizens shall not be encroached 
upon." 
3.4: Regional DevelopmentPolicies 
Developing China's regions outside of the coastal areas is neither new nor is it 
historically tied to a specific political ideology. Dwight Perkins lays out a pre- 1978 
timetable that notes efforts in the mid-nineteenth century to develop the interior, post- 
1949 era attempts to counter the perceived residue of capitalist-imperialist east coast bias, 
and 1960s and 1970s proposals that can be traced to national security needs?' Post-1 978 
modernization reforms actually started in the countryside with an emphasis on agriculture 
and the development of township village enterprises (TVE). However, Yao concludes 
that state policies shifted away fiom rural development by 1985 and, in effect, used "the 
success of rural reform to subsidize the resbructuring of the urban economy.'J6 
Expanding on the pro-east bias in planning, Lin and Chen maintain that China, like most 
other countries, has inherent, differentiating, regional factors such natural resource 
endowments, production technologies, and industrial structures, but "the Chinese 
IS Dwight Perkins, "Designing a Regional Strategy for China." in Ding Lu, William A. W. Neilson, 
China's West Region Development: Domestic Shalegies and Global lmplicatiom, (Singapore: Wodd 
Scientific Publishing Co. h e .  Ltd, 2004). 17. 
'6 Shujie Yao, "China's Rural Economy in the First Decade of the 21* Century: Problems and Growth 
Constraints," China Economic Review 13 (2002): 355. 
experience also has its own unique factors, such as economic reforms and government 
policies that are peculiarly ~hinese."~' 
At the present time, there are several on-going domestic strategies that target rural 
development. Planning and implementation is a function of the National Development 
and Refom Commission (NDRC) and issues most commonly addressed include: social 
services, infrastructure projects, migrant labor, health services, education and the 
environment." Two large and coordinated efforts, the Western Development Program 
(WDP) and the "Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China," provide insights into the 
emphasis and direction of the PRC's strategic planning and thinking vis-A-vis regional 
development. The historical and spatial circumstances underlying the two programs are 
fundamentally different. However, it is interesting to note that the NDRC remediation 
plans for both incorporate a central planning aspect. Both programs predate Harmonious 
Society, but have been integrated into national policy as evidenced by having 
departmental status within the N D R C . ~ ~  
3:4.1: "Go West" 
The most recognizable geographic / topographic features of the western region are 
mountains and desert. It is estimated that 96 percent of the land is not cultivated due to 
desert in the northwest section and poor water and soil resources in the southwestern 
section.40 The natural conditions result in limited agricultural development except for 
"WUU-~ong Lin and Thomas P. Chen, "China's Widening Economic Disparities and Its 'Go West 
Program,"'Journal of Contemporaty China 13, Issue 41 (November 2004): 672. 
The list is a composite drawn from articles and press releases appearing on the official PRC 
website. See: http:/Iwww.gov.cnlenglish/specia~rd-index.hm. 
39 See "Main Functions of Departments of NDRC" located on the NDRC website, 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/. 
Lin and Chen, 673. 
areas in Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces. At the start of the WDP, western industrial 
ventures, though never as developed as the east, were dominated by underperforming 
SOEs. 4 '  Transportation and communication inbtructure has lagged behind the rest of 
the country which in tum has impeded the region's efforts to attract foreign and domestic 
investment.42 In terms of strategic geography, two-thirds of China's international borders 
are found along the western and central regions." 
In launching the WDP as official policy as part of the Tenth Five Year Plan, 
Premier Zhu Rongji characterized the policy as being of "great significance to the 
country's economic development, national solidarity and social stability" as well as "a 
key step in achieving the country's strategic goal of building a well-to-do society in all 
areas of life in the new century.'& Scholarly literature, while not disagreeing with Zhu's 
comments, varies in its fmdmgs when describing the motivations for promulgating the 
WDP. Qunjian Tian cites domestic "political complications" of unequal development as 
a major reason and asserts an active lobbying effort of the central government by western 
leaders to grant them similar policies to those granted to eastern provinces. 45 Lin and 
Chen come to a similar fmding but simply state, "the need to develop western China grew 
out of concern about widening disparities.'* Goodman, citing leadership and media 
statements, considers developing state capacity and nation-building, especially regarding 
41 Hongyi Hany Lai, "China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and 
Prospects," Modern China 28, no. 4 (October 2002), 443. 
42 Lin and Chen, 673. 
" Lai, 448. 
" Zhu Rongji, "Premier Zhu Rongji's Explanation of 1Gth Five-Year Plan Drafting," 
h~://www.chinaorg.cn/e-15115-3-gI15-3-g-I .htm, (accessed March 14,20 10). 
45 Qunjian Tian, " C h i  Develops its West: Motivation, Strategy and Prospect," Journal of 
Contemporary Chino 13, Issue 4 1 (November 2004): 62 1 .  
46 Lin and Chen, 668. 
the assimilation of non-Han Chinese indigenous to the western provinces, as the true 
rationales."' 
The analysis of underlying factors behind the western strategy also considers 
world events and their potential impact on China. In particular, this line of thought tends 
to contextualize Premier Zhu's comments regarding "social stability." The launch of 
WDP in 1999 -2000 occurred not long after the fall of Communism in the former Soviet 
Union, and ethnic fighting and an ensuing international intervention in the former 
Yugoslavia. Within the same timeframe, China experienced an increase in ethnic, 
separatist unrest in the western provinces of Tibet and ~ i n j i a n ~ . ~ '  As Chinese leadership 
would hope to avoid a replay of these types of events within China, the policy shift could 
be judged as reactive. 
At the five year mark in 2004, Naughton observed that the WDP was more of a 
realignment of established policies (re-packaging with more publicity), as opposed to a 
sudden policy shift.49 The argument is supported when considering actions of the Eighth 
and Ninth Five-Year Plans (1991-1995,1996-2000) where one fmds projects such as the 
Three Gorges Dam, water control projects, railroad building, and energy projects in the 
form of development of oil and natural gas fields in ~ i n j i a n ~ . ~ ~  The official website of 
the WDP lends additional credence to Naughton's supposition when reviewing its list of 
47 David Goodman, "The Campaign to 'Open up the West': National, Provincial-level and Local 
Perspectives," The China Quarterly, No. 178 (June 1,2004). 
hitp://www.proquest.com.ezproxy.shu.edu~, (accessed March 14,2010). 
"Bany Naughton, "The Western Development Program," in Bany J. Naughton and Dali Yang 
(editors), Holding China Together: Diversify and Nationai Integration in the Post-Deng Era, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 255. 
"10 Years's ~chievements."~' While the fust three topics of achievements (economic 
growth, people's livelihoods, and environmental protection) paint an improving picture of 
conditions in the west, the largest section is devoted to infrastructure construction that 
includes: the completion of high speed rail links between Xian and Zhengzhou, railways 
in Xinjiang, Guizhou and Tibet, airports in Sichuan, Tibet and Gansu, energy related 
projects (thermal, hydroelectric, solar, and natural gas pipe lines) in at least three 
provinces, and new highway construction throughout the region?' By the end of 2007, 
China had started ninety-two key construction projects in the western region, with a total 
investment of more than 1.3 trillion yuan." 
See: h~J/en.chinagate.cdfeatures/Westem~Deve1opmenUnode~7084033 .htm#, (accessed March 
lo, 2010). 
*' List distilled from press releases found at: 
http:Nen.chi~gate.cn/features/Westem~DevelopmenUnode7084035.h, (accessed March 13,2010). 
53 Wang Hongjiang (editor), "China to launch 10 key projects in westem regions," China View, June 
2 1,2008, h t t p : N r s s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / n e w s c / e n g l i s h / 2 0 ,  (accessed March 10, 
2010). 
3:4.2: Revitalizing the Northeast 
Against the backdrop of glaring growth in the eastern and southern regions, the 
struggling northeast becomes more noticeable. The central government is well 
awareoffhe region's problems. After the western development campaign was 
launched, the issue of northeast China's development topped the agenda. The 
Communist Party of China's 16" National Congress in November 2002 pledged 
to support the transformation of the northeastern industrial bases. 
-O$cial Communique, July 19, 2005 
The other regional program of note is situated in the northeastern section of 
China. Appropriately named, "Revitalizing the Northeast," the program is concerned 
with re-development of the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. The 
development needs of this part of China differ considerably ikom those of the western 
provinces. Whereas the west suffered from a historical lack of economic development, 
the northeast was one of China's original industrial areas. Today, l i e  many original but 
now declined industrial areas in many parts of the world, it is often referred to as a "rust 
belt." 
The northeast is the traditional home of China's heavy industries - steel plants, 
metal mines, oil refineries, and shipbuilding fa~tories.'~  on Sigurdson notes that the 
modernization policies of the past thirty years have yet to produce a full industrialization 
in China and, similar to the western area, northeastern China has been left out of the 
development process due to the coastal policy bias?' Complicating matters, the region 
has been dominated by SOEs which have thus far been unable to restructure into market 
driven enterprises. Specific reasons given for the failure to effectively modernize 
" Cheng Li, "China's Northeast: From Largest Rust Belt to Fourth Economic Engine?," China 
Leadership Monitor 9 (Winter 2004), http://www.hoover.org/pub1ications/~Missue2904601 .hhnl, 
(accessed January 17,ZO 10). 
'* Jon Sigurdson, "Northeast China - Cradle of Change," Journal of Techno/ogv Management in 
China 1, no. 1 (2006): 54. 
include: obsolete equipment and technology, social obligations such as health care and 
worker pensions, management skills that are unsuited to the new economy, and a 
longstanding, entitlement attitude of regional residents regarding the SOE culture.56 
While economic indicators such as per capita income do not reflect the rich-poor 
gap one finds in other interior provinces, an alarming statistic shows the region's 
contribution of industrial output as a percentage of the national total decreased from 17 
percent in 1978 to 9 per cent in 2002." In a 2004 interview, Premier Wen Jiabao 
characterized the problem as a "gap in development" between the northeast and southeast 
as well as an "over-reliance on one sector."58 The latter statement was a reference to the 
region's high percentage of SOE employment. The depletion of natural resources, many 
of which have been exploited since the period of Western and Japanese imperialism, have 
challenged cities that are essentially focused on a particular enterprise. Not unlike 
Detroit, Buffalo or Scranton in the United States, this in turn has made it difficult for 
these cities to modernize urban infrastructure and address the issue of restoring the local 
The job of revitalization is no small task. It amounts to recasting the area's 
economy by modernizing heavy industries with marketdriven management methods and 
modem technology. The transformation also requires attracting capital, both foreign and 
56 Ibid, 55, and Jonathan R. Woetzel, "Reassessing China's State Owned Enterprises," McKinsey 
Quarterly, (July 2008), hnp://www.m&inseyqusrterly.comlRe~~sessing-C~n~-s~te- 
owned-enterprises-2149, (accessed May 28,2009). 
Wen Jiabao, "Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council Receives an Interview by Russian 
Journalists," September 22,2004, http:/lwww.fmprc.gov.cn~engltopics/wjacfdo/tl60394.h, (accessed 
March IS, 2010). 
j9 William hlako (editor), Thina Facilitating lnveshnent and Innovation: A Market-Oriented 
Approach to Northeast Revitalization," World Bank Report No. 34943-CN, February 15,2006, 
hnp:Ngo.worldbank.orplrIEfiIIVS2D0., (accr.ssed February I I ,  2010). 6. 
domestic, to effect sustainable development. As with other areas of China, the northeast 
is mandated to maintain environmental protection as it modernizes. The two biggest 
elements of downside risk in the process are the cost of modernization and the potential 
job losses arising from greater efficiencies. Sigurdson summarizes the challenges as: 1) 
resistance to economic reform due to dominance of traditional industries andtor big 
SOEs; 2) serious employment issues; 3) weak infrastructure and services discouraging 
FDI; and 4) local authorities who are "inward-looking, resistant to operate with the 
surrounding environment and often 
The official objectives of the Northeast Development Strategy (NDS) articulated 
in various government publications in 2004 include: 1) upgrade and rebuild outdated 
industries; 2) agricultural development (raise food production, manufacturing, 
agricultural product processing); 3) improve environment of mining areas; 4) develop 
third service industries (modernization of fmance, advancement of private economy, 
establishment of social welfare system); 5) enhance investments; 6) build basic 
infrastructures such as transportation, resources, and irrigation; and 7) transform Dalian 
into an international harbor in Northeast ~ s i a . ~ '  The initial plan set a deadline of 2020. 
Early analysis, such as that of Li, characterized the plan as "structural adjustments 
in terms of ownership reform, industrial redistribution, and state-owned enterprise 
reconstruction." 62 However, rather than "structural adjustments," a 2006 World Bank 
study concluded a more active and dominant role of central government planning in 
stating, "the program for Northeast revitalization emphasizes continued direct 
" Sigurdson, 71. 
6' Yoon Hwy-I& "China's Northeast Project: Defensive or Offensive Strategy?," East Asian Review 
16, No. 4 (winter 2004), 101, footnote 4. 
'' Li, 4. 
government intervention in directing support to favored sectors and f m s ,  especially to 
~ 0 ~ s . ' " ~  The report listed central planning impacts in: 
Finance: Direct support, in the form of fmancing from treasury bonds, for 
appmximately 100 projects in 2003, 197 in 2004 and 40 in 2005. 
Tar Relief: Industrial sectors including: equipment manufacturing, petroleum and 
pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, shipbuilding, automotive production, agricultural 
products, military goods, and high-tech industry were selected for a pilot reform 
of the value-added tax (VAT) in July 2004. Other forms of tax relief included: 
reduction of the enterprise income tax (faster depreciation of fixed assets and 
faster amortization) and reduction of resource-depletion taxes for some Northeast 
mines and oil fields. 
Lending Practices/Access to Capital: China's four large state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs) and three policy banks were given greater flexibility to restructure 
or write-off non-performing loans to SOEs. Preferential lending was granted to 
large SOEs for restructuring and loan guarantees were given to laid-off workers. 
"Pillar industries: " Preferred status given to: equipment nlanufacturing, 
petrochemicals, energy, food processing (including tobacco and soft drinks), 
pharmaceuticals, and forestry." 
Additionally, public / private partnerships were established at the outset to address issues 
such as: pension support, subsidies for laid-off workers, minimum urban subsistence 
payments (dibao), social security subsidies, bankruptcy, and social services previously 
administered by ~ 0 ~ s . ~ '  
In terms of assessing how the NDS went fiom planning to implementation, the 
Chinese Government Official Web Portal provides a listing of programs, announcements 
Mako, 7. 
Ibid, 7-8. 
Ibid. 
and achievements related to the NDS. The announcements indicate inflows of foreign 
direct investment from at least twenty-six countries in 2005, most of which is dedicated 
to the industrial sect0r.6~ For the 2007 accounting period, reports listed 19,166 FDI 
projects with funding of over $93 billion Among economic activities, the site 
features announcements of oil production goals being met (2005), nuclear power plants 
built (2006), transportation improvements (high speed rail and new rail lines in 2006) and 
increased, more efficient production in the automobile industry.68 Also prominent among 
the economic announcements are reports of projects rejected due to environmental 
concerns and successfid environmental  reclamation^.^^ The site's lead article 
summarizes the first five years of the NDS effort by noting that in 2007 Liaoning 
Province's GDP exceeded one trillion yuan joining Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Henan, Hebei provinces and Shanghai Municipality in the one trillion yuan 
GDP club." The article concluded, "With the support of the central government, 
Liaoning has seen fast expansion in the equipment manufacturing business characterized 
by machine tools and shipbuilding."7' 
66 See, "NE China Reports Double Digit Rise in Overseas Investment Inflow," 
http:Nenglish.gov.cnn005-07/25lcontent~23666.htm, (accessed March 14,201 0). 
67 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statisitcal Yearbook 2008 Table 17-19, 
http:/lwww.stats.govhttp:llwww.stars.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/i~n/tjsjlndsj/2008/index&.htm. 
%ee h~Jlenglish.gov.cnlspeciaVne~03.htm 
69 Ibid. 
" "China's Efforts to Rejuvenate Northeastern Rust Belt Pay Off," http://english.gov.cnn008- 
0111 3lcontent-8568 1 O.hhn, (accessed March 16,2010). 
7' bid. Note: Liaoning is the largest of the provinces and possesses the port of Dalian. Heilongjiang 
and Jilin lag considerably behind. It should also be noted that Jilin's economic base is primarily 
agriculture. 
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Chapter Four: Data Analysis 
China watchers should now address some hndamental questions in Chinese 
politics: who gets what, when, and why. - Cheng Li, Hoover Institute 
4.1: Hukou 
As mentioned in the narrative of Chapter 3, since the beginniig of economic 
reforms in the 1980s that required a bigger pool of cheap labor, some larger cities have 
moved toward a general, but uneven relaxing of the hukou restrictions. The central 
government took preliminary steps in 2003 and 2004 issuing regulations that instructed 
municipal governments to: 1) simplify the application process for migrant workers in 
search of work; 2) assist trade unions in securing collective contracts for migrant workers 
on the basis of "equality and consultation;" and 3) mandate employers to compensate 
migrant workers for work-related injuries.' Job training is also a part of the 2003-2004 
reforms but it is the responsibility of local governments to provide the service. Other 
reforms originating at the national level since 1998 include: 
Children may be registered at the location of the hukou of either parent. 
Senior citizens (man over sixty, or a woman over fifty-five) with n d  hukou 
registration may obtain an urban hukou based on a son or daughter's registration 
provided the senior has no dependents in the rural area. 
A person with rural hukou registration may qualifL for urban registration based on 
business investment or apartment purchase in an urban area.' 
Though most of the publicized reform activity has been legislative in nature, 
Lijiang Zhu notes that there has been substantial activity in judicial cases challenging the 
hukou system especially since the passage of Law of Legislative Procedure of the 
' Davies and Ramia, 142. 
Lijiang Zhu, "The Hukou System of the People's Republic of China: A Critical Appraisal under 
International Standards of Internal Movement and Residence," Chinese Journal ofLaw 2, no. 2 (2003): 
546. 
People's Republic of China in 2000.' The case of Sun Zigang, who was beaten to death 
in a jail after being arrested for not carrying his registration papers, is cited as the impetus 
for review and replacement of the "Measures for Custody and Repatriation of Urban 
Vagrants and Beggars" which had been a principal enforcement tool of hukou since 
1982.~ While general instructions from the central government have been enacted, hukou 
reforms vary from place to place, essentially de-centralizing the policy. Basic 
qualifications for obtaining an urban hukou require a fixed residence and a minimum 
residency period working in the specific urban area? 
Representative examples of local requirements are those currently in force in 
Shanghai. To qualify for permanent residency in Shanghai applicants: 1) must have a 
Shanghai residency certificate and have been in the city's social security system for at 
least seven years; 2) must be taxpayers; 3) need to have obtained vocational qualification 
of medium or high levels; 4) have never violated family planning policies; and 4) have 
clean credit and criminal  record^.^ To put the requirements in perspective, 3,000 people 
were reportedly eligible for a Shanghai hukou last year and Shanghai has a population of 
6 million people who do not have permanent residency.' 
In 2007, Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Guangxi and Chongqing, 
were among twelve provinces to participate in a trial phase out of differentiated rural and 
urban hukou and Beijing and some cities in Guangdong Province have relaxed some of 
' Ibid, 547. 
Ibid. 550. 
Zhang Ye,Young and Hulme, 32. 
"Shanghai May Further Relax Hukou System," China Doily, March 16,2010, 
http:llwww.chinaorg.cn~chinan010-03/16/content~l9616205.htm, (accessed March 28,2010). 
' Ibid. 
the restrictions that previously hindered people from changing their hukou.' However, 
articles appearing in 2009 on the Wall Speet Journal's China Real Time website featured 
report titles that read, "Public Housing in Beijing, Non-Residents Need Not Apply," and 
"Great Wall of Shanghai: Chinese Metropolis Wants (Some of) YOU.'" Clearly, reform is 
an on-going and unsettled issue. 
One analysis of hukou reforms concluded that they are "effectively merging a 
system of institutional exclusion based on place of residence with one based on 
individual wea~th."'~ The study of Davies and Ramia concludes that the central 
government, rather than abolishing hukou "despite the recognition that the system 
produces de facto institutionalization of class segregation and discrimination," has chosen 
a path "to reform it through new policies aimed at facilitating the greater movement of 
rural residents into towns and cities and providing them with entitlements previously 
enjoyed only by urban residents."" Along the same line of thinking, Chan and 
Buckingham note that the hukou system is a core institution and a legacy of the planned 
With an estimated 100 million to 150 million internal migrants, the issue of hukou 
reform is approaching a tipping point. On March 1,2010, thirteen newspapers in the 
Rong Jiaojiao, "Hukou 'An Obstacle to Market Economy'," China Daily, May 21,2007, 
http:Nwww.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-05/21/content~876699~2.htm, (accessed March 26,2010). 
See China Real Time Report, hnp:Nblogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/tapmukou/, (accessed March 29, 
2010). 
'O. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, "China's Household Registration System: 
Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants," October 7,2005, 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newsmukou.pdf, (accessed March 26,201 O), 12. 
" Davies and Ramia, 142. 
'' Chan and Buckingham, 606. 
PRC called for abolition of the system.I3 Though several papers would later retract the 
article, the initial printing of the editorial was significant in that most media in China is 
still largely state contro~led.'~ 
4.2: Private Property 
Taken in sum, the events leading to the new law reflect an orderly, evolutionary 
process carried out by legislative actions and constitutional changes. An interesting 
aspect of the legislative portion is the amount of time and debate that was needed for final 
approval. The Wmhington Post in describing final passage of the 2007 law noted: 
"...opposition, reaching into Communist Party ranks, led President Hu Jintao's 
government to pull back an earlier draft of the bill during last year's legislative sessi~n." '~ 
Also noting the open differences of opinion but emphasizing the work needed to achieve 
"ideological consensus," Matthew Erie observed that from start to finish, the Property 
Law Draft went through "a rare six readings in the NPC and in formulating the various 
provisions, forty-seven central government departments, sixteen large companies, 
twenty-two academic institutions, and no less than 11,500 members of the public had 
been consu~ted."'~ 
I 3  Wen Liao, "The Princeling and the Paupers," Foreign Policy, March 5,2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articied2OI0/03/OS/thegrinceIingOanddthegaupen, (accessed March 26, 
2010). 
Ibid. 
Cody 
l6 Erie, 934. 
The thrust of the law is to provide equal protection to state, collective and 
personal property.17 Some saw its passage as an accommodation to entrepreneurs who 
have come to dominate the market economy." Another reason given within the reporting 
community was that the measure represented a concession to rural farmers who have 
been frustrated over the expropriation of farm land without, in the farmers' opinion, 
consistently just c~m~ensa t ion . '~  Though some Chinese academics and "New Left" 
politicians claimed the law was unconstitutional in that granting personal property rights 
is antithetical to socialism, the current administration of Hu Jintao proceeded with its 
passage.20 In a speech to the National Peoples Congress (NPC) in March 2007, Vice- 
Premier Wang Zhaoguo articulated the official reasons for adopting the law as: 
The need to uphold the basic socialist economic system. 
The need to regulate the order of the socialist market economy -a  clear-cut 
defmition of property and fair competition are the basic requirements for 
developing the socialist market economy. 
safeguard the immediate interests of the people - people's living standards 
have improved in general, and they urgently require effective protection of 
their own lawful property accumulated th&ughhard work. 
0 Achieve the goal of establishing a Chinese-style socialist legal system by 
2010 - Property law is an important component part of the civil code.2' 
17 Angela Wang, "Property Rights in China Under the New Property Law," World Law Direct, April 
2007, http://www.worldlawdirect.codarticld3149/pmperty-rights-china-new-pmperty-law-2007.h~l, 
(accessed March 21,201 0). 
'"ody. 
l9 "China's Next Revolution," The Economist, March 8,2007, 
http://w.economist.codopinionlPrinterFridy.cfm?stoid=88 15075, (accessed March 23,2010). 
20 bid. 
2 '  Wang Zhaoguo, "Explanation on the Drat? Property Law of The People's Republic of China," 
Speech to the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 8,2007, Peoples Daily, 
March 8,2007, http~/english.people.com.cn/2OO7O3/O8/en@OO7O3O8835549 .html, (accessed March 23, 
2010). 
While the law does not abolish the principle that all land belongs to the state, it institutes 
new protections covering private homes, businesses, and farmers with long-term leases 
on their fields.22 Article 42 of the law allows for land expropriation in the name of "public 
interest." However, as a condition it specifies that compensation be paid for the land and, 
specific to the agricultural sector, it provides monetary resettlement allowances designed to 
protect the hture livelihood of farmers.23 
4.3: Regional Development 
At the start of the WDP, Bruce Gilley observed that the central government's 
main contribution to the effort would be It appears Gilley was prophetic 
based on the inflow of government capital reported. However, local officials interviewed 
for the article held that government policy was "misguided" and what was really needed 
was an equalization of economic policies between the east and the west.25 Though three 
SEZs have been created in the region, the WDP still does not employ the same range of 
free market tools found in east and the program is largely a top-down, central planning 
design. 
It has also been observed that the aims and content of the campaign have often 
appeared poorly defmed and subject to the competing priorities of the PRC's decision- 
makimg process." It is estimated by some that the program will need to continue for at 
least another twenty years in order for the west to approach eastern levels of prosperity.27 
l2 Cody. 
"Erie, 943. 
24 Bruce Gilley, "Saving the West," Far E&rn Economic Review 163, Issue 18 (May 2000): 1 
25 bid, 2. 
26 . Lm and Chen, 683, and Goodman, 317. 
27 &id. 
The program of re-development of the northeast presents something of hybrid 
model. While one witnesses the evident hand of the central government in the process, 
there is also an emphasis on privatization from the same central government. This may 
be explained by a recent study that looked at SOEs as a whole and concluded several 
recent government initiatives appear aimed at re-establishing central government 
authority over key ~ 0 ~ s . ~ ~  A legal factor that keeps the rust belt tied to the larger SOEs 
is their strategic classification. Currently, complete state ownership or control occurs in 
SOEs involved in defense, power generation and distribution, telecom, oil and 
petrochemical, coal, civil aviation, and shipping industries which are considered 
"strategic." So-called "pillar industries" such as machinery, auto, information 
technology, construction, steel, base metals, chemicals, land surveying, and research and 
development are allowed shared ownership but the state still maintains a controlling stake 
relative to the industry's importance.29 A quick reading of the two lists finds many of the 
principal industries of the northeast. 
Though direct monetary infusion by the central government is not as apparent in 
the northeast as it is with the western infrastructure projects, preferential policies in 
lending by state controlled banks, favorable tax policies that can only be granted by the 
central government, and ultimate state control of strategic SOEs display the hallmarks of 
a high degree of central planning in the NDS program. FDI and market drivers are 
Mikael Mattlin, "Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Control," BICCS Asia 
Paper 4, No. 6 (2007), 
h t t p : / / w w w . v u b . a c . b e m i c c d s i t e / a s s e t s / f i  (accessed 
March 16,2010). 
29 bid. 
evident in non-strategic industries, but, at the present time, it would be a stretch to 
consider Anshan Steel or Shenyang Aircraft as subject to market forces. 
Though the market reforms of the revitalization program do not compare in scale 
with the models found to the south, it can be seen as an updated version of modernization 
that is more suited to the comfort levels of both the local residents and the current central 
planners. In a way, the modernization (especially into high tech) and diversification are 
somewhat prescriptive as a source of social stability by providing new, local 
opportunities for a populace that is traditionally accustomed to a relatively high living 
standard. 
4.4: Summary 
In the fust chapter, it was noted that in the thirty years that have passed since the 
implementation of Deng Xiaoping's modernization reforms, China has undergone a 
paradigmatic shift in its domestic policy, moving f?om a centralized, command economy 
to accepting a more open, market-driven model. The next two sections of this paper 
evaluate the rich-poor gap programs described earlier on the basis of whether the 
initiatives, 1) represent continuity with the established market approach; and 2) whether 
any shift in ideology can be discerned. 
4.4.1: Central Planning or Market Driven? 
In 2005, the Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, Ma 
Kai, stated China has basically completed the transition to the socialist market economy 
from a highly centralized planning economy.30 Mr. Ma's defmition of socialist market 
economy is a "system in which the public ownership economy plays the leading role and 
30 "China Has Socialist Market Economy in Place," Peoples Daily Online, July 13,2005, 
http://enplish.peopledaily.com.cn/200507Il3/eng20050713~195876.hhnl, (accessed March 29,2010). 
co-exists and shares opportunities with the economy in various other o ~ n e r s h i ~ s . " ~ '  This 
definition differs from the so-called "invisible hand" of the market defined by Adam 
Smith but serves to frame this discussion in determining whether the rich-poor gap 
initiatives outlined in paper are market driven or central planning. 
The continued maintenance of hukou appears to be a clear cut example of an 
anachronistic legacy of central planning in that the central government controls the flow 
of labor which is an important element of production. Various authors point out that 
abolition of the system would improve economic efficiency, arguing that efficient 
industrial production requires a settled, more highly skilled workfor~e?~ However, 
market forces have also had a telling impact on both the mechanics of the system and its 
preservation. The decentralization of hukou allows localities to set specific criteria. 
Economic growth and development resulting from modernization has created regional 
competition for resources, particularly investment capital. The new qualification 
measures implemented by cities such as Shanghai and Beijing reflect the competition by 
allowing mobility for the more skilled, educated and wealthy segments of the labor 
pool.33 At the other end of the spectrum, urban areas exhibit protectionism in controlling 
surplus numbers of migrants that would drive down wages and conditions for the existing 
workforce.34 Controlling the migrant flow also allows municipalities to manage 
consumption of direct and indirect public services. 
'' bid. 
'' Alexander and Chan, 623. 
" Fei-ling Wang, 129. 
" ~kxander  and Chen, 620. 
Due to the very public debate surrounding its passage, private property reform 
provides a considerably different perspective from the evolving reform of hukou. In 
considering the timeline of events that led to adopting the reform measure, one can draw 
parallels to the process of modernization in general. In many respects, the change in the 
law can be seen as heavily influenced by market forces. Legal reforms provide the 
structure necessary for contracts and inve~tment.~' In practical terms, privatization of 
business enterprises led to privatization of housing and ensuing opportunities to create 
wealth through a housing market. Wealth generation occurred faster than expected, 
particularly in urban areas, and before an efficient property rights inbtructure could be 
firmly estab~ished?~ Though many corporate enterprises developed a comfort level with 
informal rights from partner localities, private entrepreneurs, a growing class, did not 
have the same degree of ~onfidence.~' 
The lack of structure also presented the potential for conupt practices and state 
predation?8 In fact, the increased demand for land needed for urbanization and 
development serves as a negative criterion for property rights. Specifically, low 
compensation for land taken and the practice of local governments and developers using 
land for commercial purposes in violation of the original public purpose has threatened 
'' Erie, 926. 
I6 Andrew Sheng, Xiao Geng, and Wang Yuan, "Property Rights and 'Original Sin' in China: 
Transaction Costs, Wealth Creation, and Property Rights Infrastructure," Stanford Center for International 
Development (SCID) Working Paper 291, October 2004, http:Nsiepr.stanford.edu~puhlicationspmfildlO67, 
(accessed March 20,2010). 
37 Xiaobo Zhang, "Asymmetric Property Rights in China's Economic Growth," Conference Paper, 
American Economics Association Meetings, Boston, January 64,2006, 
http:Nwww.aeaweb.org/annual~mtg~apers/2006/0108~1300~0204.pdf (accessed March 16,201 O), 3. 
38 Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian, "Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of F i s , "  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 13, no. 2 (May 1998): 467. 
social stability in some rural areas?9 It has been noted that Chinese legislative action 
often memorializes established informal practices.40 Without the positive and negative 
market forces brought by modernization, it is hard to imagine that China would have 
promulgated the new law. Hence, the fmding for this topic is that change was market 
driven. 
At face value, the two regional development programs appear to present different 
answers to the question. The western program with its heavy emphasis on building 
infrastructure with central government funding could rightly be categorized as a product 
of central planning. The program for the northeast, however, has encouraged transfers in 
ownership of large SOEs to stock-holding companies, privatization of a large number of 
small and medium-sized fums, and capital funding from private so~rces .~ '  
At least two elements temper classifying the northeast project as market driven. 
The first involves conversion of large SOEs to stock companies. When conversion 
occurs CCP officials frequently dominate the corporate boards and the local party 
secretary or similar high official becomes the  hai inn an?^ The second mitigating factor 
relates to fmancing. As previously discussed, domestic lending is a function of state 
controlled banks. Data suggests that the region has benefited from favorable lending 
practices. However, it should also be noted that the northeastern area has done well in 
attracting substantial amounts of FDI for developmental fmancing to counter the 
relatively small amount of direct central government spending:3 In this analysis regional 
j 9  Zhang,, 15. 
"Erie, 929. 
dl Li, 6. 
42 Minxin Pei, Chino's Trapped Transition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 3 1 
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development emerges as a hybrid - small and medium SOEs in the northeast are left to 
market forces while the underdeveloped west and the key industry SOEs of the northeast 
maintain vestiges of central planning. 
Taken in their sum, the three areas of policymaking reflect the influence of market 
forces combined with varying degrees of central planning. This observation, in fact, 
comports with the definition of market socialism attributed to Minister Ma at the 
beginning of this section, "a system in which the public ownership economy plays the 
leading role and co-exists and shares opportunities with the economy in various other 
ownerships." 
4.4.2: Ideological Shifts? 
The three programs of reform analyzed cut across different facets of China's 
policymaking agenda. Given the differentiation, proposals provide indicators of possible 
shifts in ideology. The o.bjectives of the programs will be used as the main focal point. 
Hukou reform is a reactive initiative and constitutes the central government's 
awareness that the system contributes to the stratification of society and presents the 
potential for social unrest. Legal reform, in the form of property rights, was described 
earlier in the paper as reactive to the needs of the growing entrepreneur class and the 
frustrations of rural residents over land expropriation. The objective of regional 
development falls under the general strategy of "building a well-off society" by the 
middle of the twenty-first century but can also be characterized as the central 
government's effort to compensate the interior areas for their subordinate role during the 
development of the coastal regions." Of the three areas of reform the most apparent 
break with existing ideology, and the most controversial, is the subject of private property 
legal reform. Allowing equal treatment of state, collective and private property is 
contrary to the idea of state ownership that was embedded in the founding philosophy of 
the PRC. To a lesser extent, Minister Ma's quote declaring the completion of the first 
phase of market socialism is also indicative of ideological change in that it signals the 
next phase, one of more equal distribution and regional parity, will begin. Mr. Ma's 
statement combined with the apparent objective of creating greater equality through the 
three policy initiatives reflects a shift toward a more populist approach. 
Hukou reform initiatives, while not abolishing the practice, appear to attempt to 
soften some its more draconian impacts. The study of Davies and Ramia provides 
evidence of simplification of application and movement toward equalization of social 
benefits in some areas.4s Regarding private property law, Matthew Erie comments, "One 
reason for creating the legislation was to address one of the major externalities of China's 
development and the main source of social unrest in the country today: the problem of 
illegal land takings.'*6 Again, one can infer from the analysis that there is an awareness 
of a serious, grass-roots problem as well as the political initiative to take action. In his 
discussion of regional development, Li Cheng notes, "Hu and Wen seem to be more 
aware of China's daunting challenges than their predecessors were, and more-balanced 
regional economic development, with favorable policies toward the western and 
14 Hcike Ilolbiy. "The Emergence ofthe Campaign to Open up h e  West: Ideological Formation, 
Central Decision -Making and h e  Role of the Provinces," The C'hinu Qumterly, Number 178 (Jun.. 2004): 
337. 
45 Davies and Ramia, 146. 
46 Erie, 920. 
northeastern regions, has become the defining feature of  the Hu-Wen admini~tration.'~' 
The emphasis of all programs aligns with the Harmonious Society objective of social 
stability. Implicit in the stability objective is the on-going injection of  nationalism and 
national pride into policy formu~ation.~~ 
41 . LI Cheng, 3. 
Yoon Hwy-tak, "China's Northeast Project: Defensive or Offensive Strategy?," East Aaian Review 
16, no. 4, (Winter 2004): 100. 
Chapter Five: Conclusions 
Without the confidence of the people no government can stand at all 
- Confucius 
Since the implementation of the Four Modernizations in 1979, the one constant in 
China has been change. The degree and rapidity of change is reflected in a recent social 
hlstory of China that begins with the observation that "a year in China is equivalent to 
five years anywhere else."' Given the impact of the events of the last thirty years it is 
doubtful that Mao would recognize or, one might speculate, that he would approve of the 
modem China his revolution set in motion One might also question if Deng Xiaoping, 
the architect of modernization, foresaw the magnitude of change that has occurred in such 
a relatively short time. 
An observation of this research finds that political leaders in the PRC of the last 
thirty years are not dissimilar to their counterparts in most other countries in at least one 
regard - leadership change brings with it a change in policy priorities, favored projects, 
and its own sense of vision. As national policy formulation is an indicator of the 
direction of change, this research has concentrated on qualifying the scope, direction, and 
impetus of specific policy initiatives in contemporary China. Though the thesis of this 
paper - an underlying strategy of adaptable ideology as the key element to Chinese 
policymalang - does not qualify as original research, the examination of the concept 
using analysis of current policies targeting the issue of the rich-poor gap reinforces the 
concept. While the individual policies of hukou reform, enactment of private property 
rights, and the implementation of regional development strategies do not constitute the 
magnitude of ideological change compared to Deng's original pivot from Maoist 
practices, the initiatives do reflect adaptation of existing ideology to meet current needs 
by injecting a populist, "people's benefit" element. This is especially evident with regard 
to the regional development and hukou proposals. In equalizing property rights under the 
justification of advancing the "socialist market economy," Hu and Wen move even 
further away from Marxist doctrinal orthodoxy and the collective society established by 
Mao after the 1949 Revolution. 
One also discerns an institutionalized methodology for revising ideology in the 
recent policy actions. The opening chapter devoted a lengthy analysis to the formulation 
of Deng Xiaoping Theory. In crafting the theory, Deng's use of hermeneutic consistency 
to critique what he regarded as incompatible (with modernization) ideology established 
pragmatism2 as the principal governing element to guide interpretation. A conclusion 
drawn by this research contends that Deng's disconnection with the practice of blindly 
following past interpretation of doctrine allowed for future leaders to do likewise. The 
three policy actions researched for this paper exhibit a pragmatic quality either by their 
populism or by their break from Marxist orthodoxy. The infusion of populism and the 
break from orthodoxy exemplify a succession from the earlier actions of Deng in setting 
the modernization agenda and Jiang in redefining the requirements for CCP membership. 
Furthermore, Hu's citing of a modified interpretation of the 'Three Represents" to further 
his agenda is similar to Deng invoking Mao's Thought to overcome the concept of the 
"Two Whatevers" that allowed him to proceed with the original modernization plan.3 In 
~~~ - 
Deng's definition includes Mao's quote, "Seek truth through facts," as well as the directive to 
"liberate the mind." See footnote #20 on page 16. 
' ..Hu Jintao Addresses Symposium on 'Three Represents,"' 
http //www2.sinoss codportaVwebgatelen-us/CmdNewsDetail?newsld=543 (accessed, April 4.2010). 
essence, one sees the current evolutionary stage of Deng's ideological pragmatism in the 
policies of Hu as well as linkage to a defined methodology for ideological revision. 
In commenting on the ideological shift evident in "Harmonious Society," the 
national policy that is supported by the individual rich-poor gap remediation programs, 
several analysts identify a resurrection of Confucianism. A 2006 New York Times 
editorial announced, "Marxism no longer serves as Chmese society's guiding ideology," 
and made the case that in order to better connect with all classes of Chinese society 
China's leaders, includmg Hu Jintao, had begun employing Confucian principles in 
presenting their programs to the people.4 It is interesting to note that the concept of a 
harmonious society (lower case) is itself a Confucian precept.s The current leadership's 
public embrace of concepts of a philosophy that was the epitome of "reactionary thought" 
less than forty years ago is yet another sign of ideological adaptati~n.~ 
The research presented leads to several other observations related to the thesis 
statement. Hukou reform, though still an open iswe, directly broaches the thorny subject 
of individual rights. The multi-year debate on private property represents a more 
assertive, transparent legislative branch that in the past had a reputation as a "rubber 
stamp" for the upper leadership.' With regard to regional development, whde national 
objectives such as border security, domestic stability, and natural resource extraction 
4 Daniel A. Bell, "China's Leaders Rediscover Confucianism," New York Times, September 14, 2006, 
http:llwww.nytimes.com/2006/O9114lopinionll4ihtedbell.2807200.html, (accessed, April 30,2010). 
J Chenyang Li, "The Conhcian Ideal of Harmony,'' Philosophy East & West 56, No. 4 (October 
2006): 583. 
6 Sunny Lee, "Confucius Resurrected in China," The GrinnellMagazine, Fall 2008, 
http://www.gri~ell.edd~mlcommunicationlm~a~nde~~co~icius, (accessed, April 30,2010). Note: 
Lee's article suggests that ideological adaptation has moved to "ideological appropriation" in the case of 
the CCP's c u m t  use of Confucianism. 
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(particularly coal, oil, and natural gas) are facilitated by the western and northeastern 
strategies one also witnesses a government responding to an emerging political process. 
Qunjian Tian's documentation of "lobbying" of the central government by western 
provincial officials, even though the officials are selected and not elected, is an element 
of at least a nascent representative process.' Whether these Qfferent political behaviors 
represent a shift toward a more democratic or representative system is open to debate. 
Pessimistic opinions, including those of some "New Left" deputies in the National 
Peoples Congress, interpret some of the reform activity as opportunities for increasing the 
spread of c ~ r m ~ t i o n . ~  Another, less harsh opinion characterizes the behavior as 
maintaining a dependency on central authority in return for prosperity.'0 In American 
colloquial terms of political patronage and deal-making, the regional development 
policies appear to be the Chinese equivalent of the time honored method of solidifying 
political alliances and public support known as "pork barrel politics." Considered 
collectively, this research finds the rich-poor gap policies indicative of a maturing, 
possibly more pluralistic, political process. 
Though papers such as this would like to report a breakthrough in social science 
predictive modeling, using rich-poor gap policies to draw definite conclusions about 
Chma's modernization model fitting into an existing theoretical model is an unsettled 
topic. Part of the reason for this assessment is the long term horizon of the remediation 
programs. An additional factor, especially for evaluating against classic Modernization 
Theory, is the still low level of development in many of the affected areas. Similarly, this 
See: "China's Next Revolution," The Economist, March 8, 2007 
I0 Dorothy J. Solinger, "Business Groups: For or Against the Regime?." in B N C ~  Gilley and Larry 
Diamond (editors), Political Change in China, (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2008), 100. 
research could not draw any definitive conclusions regarding claims of "Chinese 
Exceptionalism," other than finding that programs such as regional development or hubu  
reform are unique products of China's economic or societal needs. Yasheng Huang's 
view of China's modernization plan as the product of conventional political-economic 
policies allowing "private sector dynamism (rise of entrepreneurial enterprise), a friendly 
financial environment, and increased recognition of property rights" is also the most 
applicable conclusion for the implementation of the policies outlined in this paper." 
Among other theoretical constructs, potential or partial matches lean toward the 
so-called East Asian Model andlor parallels to the development process of Taiwan. In 
the five steps of the East Asian Model (economic growth, pragmatic approach to reforms, 
investment in human capital including institutions like rule of law, democratization, 
constitutionalism), China's rich-poor gap policies are positioned between the second and 
third stages. Reinforcing the East Asian comparison, Albert Keidel maintains that China 
is currently in a phase similar to South Korea in the 1970s or Japan in the 1950s and that 
future political institutions will mature gradually in concert with the level of economic 
de~elo~rnent . '~  The Taiwan comparison is especially intriguing in maintaining both the 
Mainland and Taiwan start with authoritarian Leninist governing systems and proceed 
through similar economic reforms though at different points on their development 
" Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 55. 
I2 Albert Keidel, "China's Economic Rise - Fact and Fiction,"Policy Brief 61 (July 2008), The 
Camegie Endowment for Peace, 
http://www.camegieendowment.org/publicationdindex.cfm?faiew&id=20279, (accessed November 18, 
2009). 
timelines.13 The comparison may be difficult to sustain, however, since Taiwan had a 
substantial external influence (the United States) and the Mainland does not. 
Regarding whether any linkage could be established between rich-poor gap 
policies and possible changes in governance style, research indicates a more specific 
trend favoring this paper's thesis of adaptable ideology rather than any of the theoretical 
work reviewed. The regonal development and private property rights law are indications 
of increased centralization on the part of the Hu-Wen administration. Favoring an 
emphasis on the central planning side versus the public market is a distinct shift from the 
Jiang Zemin era. However, in the Jiang era policy was essentially focused on the more 
developed coastal areas where market forces originally developed with state incentives 
such as SEZs and not on the less developed interior. 
As policy priorities in any country are often reflective of leadership, it should be 
pointed out that Hu Jintao came up through the ranks of leadership by way of rural 
assignments. The policy emphasis on the outlying provinces may be attributable to his 
earlier experiences in places like Guizhou province. Hu's subtle yet populist re- 
interpretation of predecessor Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" (". . . the CPC should 
dedicate itself to the interests of the public and govern for the people's benefit...") may 
also be a reflection of Hu's rural roots. l4 
It is unknown whether Hu's emphasis on more balanced regional development 
and his more populist leaning programs will continue after he retires in 2012. Some 
suspect a return to Jiang-type policies favoring the coastal sector when Vice President Xi 
13 Peerenbloom and Chen, 137 
l4 '.Hu Jintao Addresses Symposium on 'Three Represents"', 
httpllwww sinoss.codponaYwebgatden-us~CmdNewsDetainewd=543, (accessed April 4, 20 10) 
Jinping is expected to assume the top leadership spot. Xi, a "princeling" and an adherent 
of the so-called "Shanghai School" of development, is considered to be on the opposite 
side of the debate from Hu regarding domestic issues.I5 It is altogether possible, even 
probable, that a potential Xi administration will re-interpret some aspect of past ideology 
to justify a different policy direction. Governing style, be it the current collective 
leadershp model or something different, may be signaled by a re-interpretation or a rapid 
policy shift. 
In 1984, President Ronald Reagan on his return from a visit to China provoked a 
political controversy in the United States by refemng to China as a "so-called 
communist" country. l6 While much of the press and many in the political opposition 
took issue over his dismissal of the label "communist" as applicable to China, history has 
shown that Reagan's speech had indeed identified a paradigmatic shift in China. The 
evolving definition of a "socialist market economy" indicates that shifting and adapting 
of ideology is still on-going. China is still a country with a Leninist-style authoritarian 
government but the classless society prescribed by Marxism is a thing of the past. 
OEcial rhetoric still maintains much of the classic Marxist verbiage but policies such as 
those analyzed in this paper appear to be designed to foster wealth generation and, to 
borrow a phrase from the United States Constitution, "ensure domestic tranquility." 
In the bigger picture, will adaptable ideology lead to democratization? The 
answer appears to be a "definite maybe." Adopting policies like those of the rich-poor 
gap that aid in the generation of personal wealth and the rise of a middle class make 
" Wen Liao. Note: A "princeling" is a descendent of C h i ' s  Revolutionary "Old Guard." 
'konald Reagan, "Remarks at a Luncheon With Community Leaders in Fairbanks, Alaska," May 1, 
1984, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archivedspeechedl984/5Ol84d.htm, (accessed April 3, 2010). 
possible many of the conditions Samuel Huntington and others describe as "necessary for 
democracy." By the same token, Huntington is quick to point out that although favorable 
conditions may exist it doesn't ensure the process of democratization will necessarily 
occur. 17 
Perhaps more to the point is the response of a former United States Defense 
Attache to Beijing. Major General Bernard Loeffke grew up in the country of Colombia, 
attended West Point as a foreign cadet, and sewed in Beijing in the mid-1980s. In 
retirement he obtained a degree as a physician's assistant and has frequently spent 
summers in Shaanxi province teaching emergency medical techniques. When asked 
about the prospects for democracy in China, General Loeffke's response was a quick, 
"No, other things come first." He then added three words in Spanish, "techo, rrabajar y 
taco" - shelter, work, and food.18 
The policy response to the rich-poor gap, while perhaps not an immediate catalyst 
for democratization or system change, reflects the ability of the CCP to adapt at several 
different levels to the changing needs of the Chinese populace. If the programs outlined 
in this paper are continued in subsequent administrations they appear to have the 
potential to diversify wealth generation and raise living standards. If all goes according 
to plan the CCP leadership will see a much larger middle-class and, potentially, a more 
pluralistic society. The recent debates over the private property law and reform of the 
huhu system have shown less than unanimity among the governing elite. The increase 
in stakeholder groups created by successful growth and development will tend to make 
similar debates of the future even more complex. 
17 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, (Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 28. 
Major General Bemard Loeae ,  USA (Retired), Telephone Interview, October 12,2009. 
Chinese dissident Liu Binyan has described the process of Chinese modernization 
as a "welding of Western capitalism with Marxism-Leninism and even aspects of 
Confucianism" while concurrently attempting to resist the influences of democracy and 
f reed~m. '~  In a similar vein, Minxin Pei has observed that historically, "CCP fear of 
independently organized social interests does not prepare it for the emergence of the 
interest groups that a more developed society inevitably creates."20 A "more developed 
society" is clearly the goal of the specific programs described in this thesis and of 
China's overall modernization strategy. As China moves closer to that goal it will be. 
interesting to see if the CCP's adaptable ideology helps the Party to maintain its hold on 
power or if that same adaptability ironically proves to be the principal reason for its 
downfall as a political monopoly. 
19 . LIU Binyan, "Civilization Grafting: No Culture is an Island," Foreign Afmrs 72, No. 4 
(SeptemberIOctober 1993): 20. 
20 Minxin Pei, China )S Trqped Transition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 8. 
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